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ABSTRACT MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
The purpose of this thesis is to examine two books that
advance alternate theories to explain the success or failure
of special operations. The first book is Perilous Options:
Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy ,
by Lucien S. Vandenbroucke . Vandenbroucke discusses
recurrent problems with U. S. special operations and
identifies what he believes are the causes of failure of
such operations. The second book is Spec Ops , written by
William H. McRaven . McRaven examines eight historic cases
from around the globe and develops his theory on how to
conduct successful special operations. From the analysis of
three recent Navy SEAL special operations missions, both
theories seem to provide a useful tool for thinking about
the failure or success of special operations. Combining
these theories provides a complete framework for senior
planners and tacticians in formulating a plan for
successfully conducting future special operations missions.
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I . INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of warfare, small units have
repeatedly conducted operations against a larger,
defensively positioned enemy. Defying what Carl von
Clausewitz, in his book "On War," defines as the superior
form of warfare, these smaller forces have regularly
succeeded in defeating the defensive enemy. From the rescue
of Benito Mussolini, to the Entebbe raid, these operations
have successfully been conducted to achieve foreign and
defense policy goals. United States forces have conducted
several such operations in support of foreign policy
objectives. Despite using what many consider to be the most
highly trained forces in the world, however, the United
States special operations have achieved only limited
success. The rescue attempt of the crew of the U.S.
freighter Mayaguez, the raid on Son Tay, and the Desert One
operation all had lack luster results. The employment of
special operations forces is increasingly being sought after
by every major Commander in Chief in the U. S. military. As
the use and critical nature of special operations increases,
their success becomes paramount to U.S. strategic goals. If
a theory exists that explains the success or failure of
special operations, then ultimately this theory could
determine the success or failure of U.S. strategic policy.
This thesis will examine two books that advance
alternate theories to explain the success and failure of
special operations. The first book is Perilous Options:
Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy- ,
by Lucien S. Vandenbrouke . Vandenbrouke is a Foreign
Service officer at the U.S. Department of State. He holds a
Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of
Connecticut, as well as advance degrees from Yale University
and the University of Paris. Vandenbrouke provides an in-
A
depth analysis of four U.S. special operations. Drawing
primarily on declassified documents and interviews,
Vandenbrouke offers his views on the way the U.S. plans and
executes strategic special operations. Vandenbrouke
discusses recurrent problems with U.S. special operations
and identifies what he believes are the causes of failure of
such operations.
Vandenbroucke, L.S., Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy,
Oxford University Press, Inc, 1993. All references to Vandenbroucke and his views are from this book.
The second book, entitled Spec Ops~ , was written by-
William H. McRaven. McRaven has been a U.S. Navy SEAL since
1978, and has commanded SEAL Team THREE, based at Coronado,
California. He is a graduate of the University of Texas and
has received a master's degree from the Naval Postgraduate
School. McRaven examines eight historical cases and
provides an analysis of each. These cases involve
operations conducted by United States, British, German,
Israeli and Italian forces. Through interviews, official
reports, and visiting the actual sites where these
operations occurred, McRaven develops his theory on how to
conduct successful special operations.
Both authors use similar methodological approaches in
analyzing special operations. Through archival research and
interviews, they formulate their theories. Even though they
are similar in this respect, they differ greatly in the
number and choice of cases, and maybe most significantly in
their purpose for analysis . Vandenbroucke examines the use
and misuse of special operations by the United States
through an in depth analysis of four operations: the Bay of
" McRaven, W.H., Spec Ops, Presidio Press, 1995. All references to McRaven and his views are from this
book.
Pigs invasion, the Son Tay raid to rescue POWs in North
Vietnam, the Mayaquez operation, and the Iran hostage rescue
mission. Vandenbroucke views all of these operations as
failures and cites their failures as being a result of five
common problems. These problems are faulty intelligence,
poor interagency and interservice cooperation and
coordination, inadequate information and advice provided to
decision makers, wishful thinking on the part of decision
makers, and micromanagement from outside the theater of
operations
.
McRaven approaches the problem from a slightly
different angle. His purpose is to identify key elements in
conducting successful special operations. To illustrate his
point, McRaven examines eight cases that span the entire
spectrum of special operations from global conventional war
to peacetime engagement. McRaven' s cases include the German
attack on Eben Emael, the Italian manned torpedo attack at
Alexandria, the British raid on Saint-Nazaire, the rescue of
Benito Mussolini, the midget submarine attack on the
Tirpitz, the U.S. Ranger raid on Cabatuan, the U.S. Army
raid on Son Tay, and the Israeli raid on Entebbe. Because
Vandenbroucke approaches his analysis from a strategic level
and McRaven approaches his analysis from a tactical level,
Vandenbroucke and McRaven both use the Son Tay raid to
support their different points of view. While Vandenbrouke
sees this operation as a failure because no hostages were
recovered, McRaven sees this operation as a success.
McRaven' s position is that in all of his cases key elements
contributed to what he believes allowed these forces to
achieve relative superiority over the enemy. He develops
six principles of special operations that allow special
forces to achieve this superiority. These principles are
simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and
purpose .
This thesis will examine both theories in depth.
Chapter II will be a discussion and overview of both
theories. The result will be a detailed analysis of what
these theories have in common and where they differ.
Chapter III will be an application of these theories to
recent operations. Utilizing case study analysis, as these
authors did, these theories will be used to analyze U.S.
Naval special operations conducted in Grenada, Panama, and
the Gulf War. This approach will test the relevance of
these theories and in doing so validate or invalidate their
application in future Naval special operations. Chapter IV
will be a summary discussion of how these theories hold up
in these more recent operations. The findings of this
thesis will formulate a theory for the successful conduct of
future Naval special operations. This theory will provide
guidelines in the successful planning and conduct of Naval
special operations. Ultimately this theory could be used to
govern the successful application of special operations in
the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives.
II. DISCUSSION/OVERVIEW
A . VANDENBROUCKE
Vandenbroucke began writing his book in the early
1980' s when, as a graduate student in political science, he
noticed what he believed were similar problems with the Iran
hostage rescue mission and the Bay of Pigs. His
observations led him to question whether the failure of
these two operations, as well as similar operations
conducted between the Cuban and Iranian missions, was due at
least in part to recurrent, systemic problems in the way the
United States plans and conducts such operations. His study
led him to closely examine U.S. strategic special operations
since World War II. His study is limited to only those
operations that were conducted after detailed review at the
highest levels of the U.S. government and were executed in
an attempt to solve major problems of U.S. foreign policy.
After eliminating any operations that he felt did not fit
this criteria, he narrowed his study to the 1970 U.S. raid
to Son Tay in North Vietnam, the 1975 Mayaquez operation,
the Bay of Pigs and the Iran hostage rescue mission.
Vandenbroucke classifies all of these missions as
strategic special operations missions. He characterizes
such missions as operations that sought to achieve major
foreign policy aims rather than just tactical objectives.
Vandenbroucke contends that all of these missions also had
several other characteristics in common. The highest
civilian and military authorities in the White House and the
Pentagon closely monitored the preparation and execution of
these missions. Strategic operations also are usually joint
endeavors involving several U.S. military services and
civilian government agencies. Such operations are high-
risk, and the possible damage to U.S. prestige is considered
to be great. In addition, according to Vandenbroucke, all
of the missions he examined displayed an additional
characteristic, they were all seriously flawed.
Vandenbroucke suggests that this lack luster record
does not merely reflect poor luck or the unique
circumstances of each operation. Rather, there are
recurrent problems as supported by comments by key players
in these operations as well as well-informed observers. The
first is faulty intelligence. In the Bay of Pigs,
Vandenbroucke recounts how the planners told the White House
that Castro's forces were largely demoralized and unlikely
to resist effectively an invasion by CIA-backed exiles. In
reality, Castro's forces proved to be highly motivated and
surprisingly well organized. So much so that they actually
drove the invading forces back to sea. Vandenbroucke quotes
Richard M. Bissell, the CIA mastermind of the invasion, who
argued, in retrospect, a chief cause of failure in the
operation was that Castro's forces "moved more decisively,
faster and in greater force than anyone had anticipated."
Vandenbroucke cites the raid on Son Tay as another
mission characterized by poor intelligence. In this case,
U.S. forces successfully raided a POW camp on the outskirts
of Hanoi only to discover that the North Vietnamese had
moved the prisoners months earlier. U.S. intelligence also
had failed to identify a military installation containing
enemy troops only minutes from the POW camp. Faulty
intelligence also marred the Mayaquez operation. According
to Vandenbroucke, the Marines assaulted Koh Tang Island
expecting to find only a handful of Cambodian Communist
(Khmer Rouge) irregulars. Instead they encountered a well
entrenched force of two hundred or more seasoned, regular
Khmer Rouge troops
.
Vandenbroucke is especially critical of U.S.
capabilities in the area of HUMINT, the collection of
intelligence by human agents. Although he concedes that the
U.S. excels at collecting intelligence through technical
means, such as overhead photography and the monitoring of
electronic transmissions, poor HUMINT was especially
critical to the Bay of Pigs, Son Tay, and the Iran raid.
Human intelligence, contends Vandenbroucke, could have
provided more accurate information about the real
capabilities and motivation of Castro's forces. Accurate
HUMINT could have provided information telling whether any
POWs were still being held at Son Tay. In the Iran
operation, U.S. intelligence did not know where in the large
compound hostages were being held. Not until they debriefed
a Pakistani cook who had worked there did they know for
sure. The information he provided, however, did not reach
the rescuers until the eve of the mission, almost too late.
Vandenbroucke ' s second reason for failure in strategic
special operations is insufficient coordination and
cooperation between the services and agencies involved. He
contends that a major criticism of the Iran hostage rescue
mission is that it was attempted by an ad hoc force of
10
different units from the four services and failed to perform
as a cohesive team. Supporting this contention,
Vandenbroucke quotes Colonel Charles A. Beckwith, commander
of the Army's Delta Force team that was supposed to free the
American hostages at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, as saying
"In Iran we had an ad hoc affair. We went out, found bits
and pieces, people and equipment, brought them together
occasionally and then asked them to perform a highly complex
mission. The parts all performed, but they didn't
necessarily perform as a team. Nor did they have the same
motivation.
"
The problem with coordination and cooperation is also
supported in Vandenbroucke ' s account of other operations as
well. There were bitter discussions by military commanders
who participated in the Bay of Pigs, concerning their CIA
counterparts. Marines who participated in the Mayaquez
operation are cited as complaining about the close air
support they received from the Air Force . Certainly this
same concern was observed by many for several decades
.
Vandenbrouke notes that the 1987 creation of a unified
special operations command, the U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM)
, may help to solve this problem. He in
11
fact has high praise for USSOCOM operations in Grenada and
the Gulf War. Whether this same success is now a
characteristic of strategic special operations remains to be
seen.
Another recurrent problem discussed by Vandenbroucke is
that the senior decision makers who evaluate and approve
these operations often receive poor information and advice.
Several occurrences are used to support this theory.
President Kennedy was apparently very upset about the advice
he received concerning the Bay of Pigs. Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy, a member of the secret White House board
that conducted the investigation and evaluated the operation
had strong words describing the JCS's failure to properly
study the plan. Robert F. Kennedy is quoted as saying
"disgraceful .. .They really didn't give it the attention that
was necessary and study that was essential and didn't
analyze the facts." In regards to the Son Tay raid, White
House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry
A. Kissinger was critical of the advice given to him by the
military. Kissinger asserts, "none of the briefings that
led to the decision to proceed had ever mentioned the
possibility that the camp might be empty." This despite
12
other reports that the military had intelligence that
supported this possibility.
Because of the relatively low cost of strategic special
operations in terms of manpower and logistics, Vandenbroucke
sees another recurrent problem with the U.S. use of such
forces. Decision makers can become overly attracted and
reliant on strategic special operations, so much so that
they often engage in wishful thinking. This practice,
asserts Vandenbroucke, often leads to over reliance and a
kind of misperception of the reality of what strategic
special operations can hope to accomplish. Richard M.
Bissell, the main CIA planner for the Cuban invasion, wrote
that the planners had engaged in wishful thinking about the
scheme. Beckwith, the former commander of Delta Force,
wrote in his book on the Iran hostage rescue mission, that
he had misgivings about the helicopter crews. Despite these
misgivings, Vandenbroucke writes that Beckwith wished the
problem away. Beckwith wrote, "On the other hand, everyone
wanted to have confidence in these leathernecks. If not
them, who? If not now, when? The Marines got the benefit
of the doubt .
"
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Vandenbroucke' s last reason for failure is that senior
military or civilian officials far from the theater of
operations often exercise excessive control over the mission
execution. Vandenbroucke cites several examples of this
recurrence in the missions he examines. During the Bay of
Pigs, Navy leaders are reported as being shocked about the
way the White House directed tactical decisions such as ship
placements and the canceling of a key D-Day air strike,
seriously weakening the invasion plan. During the Mayaquez
operation, the Commander in Chief of U.S. forces in the
Pacific (CINCPAC) , located thousands of miles from the
scene, tried to direct the movements of individual planes
and forces on or near the island of Koh Tang, where the
hostages were thought to be kept . Vandenbroucke is
especially critical in Kennedy's intervention in the Bay of
Pigs. He states that the president may rightfully intervene
in an ongoing operation if he perceives that U.S. political
interests require it. His criticism is that Kennedy did not
consult either the CIA or military before interfering. As
Vandenbroucke sees it, the White House or senior military
leaders should intervene in strategic special operations
under way only to make changes required by high level U.S.
14
political interests or by an altered military situation of
which the forces may not be aware. Vandenbroucke warns that
interference from senior officials may become even more of a
temptation as advances are made in modern communications.
In summary, Vandenbroucke makes the case for recurrent
problems that have plagued strategic special operations. He
argues that the two most common flaws in these operations
are poor coordination and poor information being provided to
the White House. He sees poor coordination as the most
serious problem with the Iran raid and also a major problem
with the Bay of Pigs and the Mayaquez operation. Poor
information being provided to the White House was the
largest shortcoming of the Bay of Pigs, a weakness of the
Iran mission, and a problem in the Mayaquez operation. Poor
intelligence was the major flaw of the Son Tay operation,
and a hindrance in the Bay of Pigs and the Iran mission.
Wishful thinking is seen as the worst flaw of the Mayaquez
operation, and a contributor to the Bay of Pigs mission and
the Iranian mission. Inappropriate intervention was
displayed in the Bay of Pigs and the Mayaquez operation.
Vandenbroucke does concede that the Son Tay raid came the
15
closest to success and displayed the fewest of these
recurrent problems
.
The last portion of Vandenbroucke ' s book is devoted to
his views on how to solve these problems. He gives great
credit to recent efforts to address some of these issues.
Most notably he has high praise for the establishment and
functioning of USSOCOM. He gives credit to USSOCOM for
conducting successful missions during both the Panama
invasion and the Gulf War. During these two conflicts he
was especially impressed with what he says was excellent
coordination among special operations forces and between
these forces and conventional forces. According to
Vandenbroucke, recent efforts for reform of U.S. special
operations forces have created a much more dependable force.
In closing, Vandenbroucke writes of his concern that special
operations forces continue to make progress, and that the
United States should be especially careful to understand and
use special operations forces only as they should be used.
B . MCRAVEN
McRaven's analysis of special operations approaches the
question from a slightly different angle. His approach is
to identify key elements at a tactical level that can
16
contribute to the successful conduct of special operations.
McRaven notes that among the large library of military-
doctrine there are none that contain a theory of special
operations. His interest in special operations is self
evident in that he himself has been a special operator since
1978. He believes that there are six principles of special
operations that if used by special operations forces can
reduce Clausewitz's frictions of war to manageable levels.
McRaven' s six principles are simplicity, security,
repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose as derived from his
eight cases. His ultimate conclusion is that by utilizing
his principles, special operations can achieve relative
superiority over an enemy.
McRaven writes that even though achieving this relative
superiority does not guarantee success, it is necessary for
success. His stated objective is to develop a theory for
the successful conduct of special operations to provide an
intellectual framework for thinking about special
operations. As Vandenbroucke narrowed the scope of his
analysis to what he considers to be U.S. strategic special
operations, McRaven narrows his scope as well. McRaven
defines a special operation as follows: WA special operation
17
is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, and
supported for a specific target whose destruction,
elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages)
, is a
political or military imperative." His definition is very
similar to what Joint Pub 3-05 defines as a direct action
mission. McRaven's eight cases, however, were always of a
strategic or operational nature and had the advantage of
virtually unlimited resources and national level
intelligence as did Vandenbroucke ' s
.
Understanding the concept of relative superiority is
important in understanding McRaven's theory. He defines
relative superiority as a condition that exists when an
attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive
advantage over the larger or well defended enemy. He
supports his view by further defining three characteristics
of relative superiority that he believes reveal themselves
in his analysis.
McRaven writes that first, relative superiority is
achieved in the pivotal moment in an engagement . He states
that in World War II, during the German attack on Eben
Emael, they achieved relative superiority in the first few
moments of the mission by using gliders and special shaped
18
charges to gain surprise and speed to overpower the enemy.
During Operation Chariot, the British achieved relative
superiority over the Germans at a dry dock at Saint -Nazaire,
France. The British modified an old destroyer and filled
it with four and a quarter tons of explosives, covered it
with armored plating, sailed it across the English Channel,
and rammed it into the German held dry dock. Once the ship
reached the outer harbor two miles form the dry dock the
Germans could not stop it. At this point, contends McRaven,
relative superiority was achieved.
The second characteristic of relative superiority
discussed by McRaven is that once relative superiority is
achieved, it must be sustained in order to guarantee
success. He cites the rescue of Italian dictator Benito
Mussolini in support of this view. During this mission, SS
Captain Otto Skorzeny conducted a glider assault on an
Italian position on top of a peak in the Apennines
Mountains. He achieved relative superiority when he
successfully stormed the position and had Mussolini in
custody. To complete the mission, however, he still had to
get Mussolini from the peak and back to Rome. This time
period required that he sustain this relative superiority.
19
According to McRaven, this was accomplished through boldness
on Skorzeny's part and by reinforcements by conventional
forces
.
McRaven goes on to assert that often the ability to
sustain relative superiority by special operations forces is
often a result of courage, intellect, boldness, and
perseverance. For example, Lt . Luigi Durand, an Italian
frogman, was able to clandestinely enter an enemy harbor
aboard a manned torpedo in order to place explosives under
the British battleship H.M.S. Valiant. After successfully
circumventing numerous obstacles such as nets, depth
charges, and security forces, he and his team mate
encountered problems that they had not counted on. The
torpedo lost ballast as they were diving under their target,
and sunk into the mud. In addition, his partner lost
consciousness and floated to the surface . Ignoring his own
extreme exhaustion and freezing temperatures, Durand single
handedly moved the torpedo into position under the ship.
Through his own tremendous perseverance and courage he was
able to sustain relative superiority and turn a potentially
failed mission into a successful one.
20
This brings us to McRaven's last characteristic of
relative superiority. According to McRaven, if relative
superiority is lost, it is difficult to regain. To
illustrate, McRaven recounts the problems British commandos
aboard the H.M.S. Cambeltown encountered after they
successfully rammed the dry dock at Saint-Nazaire . The
mission called for the commandos to disembark and destroy
various targets in the port facility. Although they
initially gained relative superiority they lost it when
German reinforcements overwhelmed them and eventually forced
them to surrender. This, according to McRaven, is typical
of an inherent weakness in special operations forces in that
they often have a lack of firepower relative to larger
conventional forces. This disadvantage is why special
operations forces must gain the initiative in order to gain
relative superiority. McRaven additionally comments that
the key to a special operations mission is to gain relative
superiority early in the engagement . The longer the
engagement, the less likely for special operations success.
This relative superiority, asserts McRaven, can be effected
through the use of his six principles.
21
McRaven's six principles; simplicity, security,
repetition, surprise, speed and purpose, are all derived
through his analysis of the eight historical cases he
studied. In each case, if one of these principles was not
adhered to, there was some degree of failure. From this
observation McRaven developed his theory of how to conduct
successful special operations. It is his position that it
is these six principles, that if taken into account during
the planning, preparation and execution of a mission, allow
special operations forces to achieve relative superiority
over the enemy, and thus greatly increase their chances for
success
.
McRaven's first principle is simplicity. It is this
principle that he considers the most crucial and yet often
overlooked. According to McRaven there are three elements
of simplicity: limiting the number of objectives, good
intelligence, and innovation. The first element of
simplicity is limiting the number of tactical objectives to
only those that are vital to accomplishing the strategic or
operational objectives of the mission. To demonstrate his
point, McRaven cites the events that happened at Eben Emael
as a good example. During this mission, Hitler had given
22
orders for German commandos to seize the fort at Eben Emael
to prevent the fort's big guns from preventing the advance
of German tanks. Although there were nineteen possible
targets they limited their objective to only nine that were
seen as the greatest threat. With only nine targets, the
German commandos were able to successfully complete their
mission.
Another example given demonstrates the problems that
arise when too many objectives are targeted. While planning
for the raid on Saint-Nazaire, the British named the
Normandy dry dock, the South Lock gates and any accessible
U-boats as the primary targets. As planning progressed,
however, the number of targets went from three to eleven.
This complicated the plan in that they had to add fifty more
soldiers and over two hundred naval support personnel to the
assault force. Because of this change more training was
required, and tactics had to be changed. This increase in
targets forced changing a simple plan with few moving parts
to a complicated plan that increased the number of personnel
and time on target.
McRaven writes that good intelligence is the second
element in developing a simple plan. With good
23
intelligence, planners can limit the number of forces to
only what is necessary. During the rescue mission at the
Entebbe Airport, the Israelis had good intelligence on the
number of Ugandan guards, and their weaponry. This allowed
Brig. Gen. Dan Shomron to reduce the size of his force. This
allowed for greater command and control and was a key
element to their success. The Germans utilized good
intelligence to raid the fort at Eben Emael. The Germans
were able to obtain detailed plans of the fortress showing
the emergency exists. The Germans used this information to
block the exits so that none of the Belgians inside the fort
could escape and overwhelm the small German force.
Although McRaven writes about the importance of good
intelligence, he places emphasis on planners' ability to use
their judgment as well. Because intelligence is often wrong
or contradictory, planners must plan what is most probable.
During the midget submarine attack against the German battle
ship Tirpitz, the submarine crew did not know how far the
net protecting the ship went below the water. They planned,
therefore, to be able to cut the net even if it extended to
the sea bottom 120 feet below. The raiders in the Son Tay
rescue mission did not know how many prisoners and guards
24
there were. They planned, therefore, for a number that was
derived from projections based on the number and size of the
buildings in the camp. In each case planners filled in the
gaps in intelligence with what was most reasonable to
expect
.
McRaven's third element in simplicity is innovation.
McRaven sees innovation as key to overcoming obstacles that
might slow a mission down or complicate the plan.
Innovation was used by the Germans with their use of gliders
to attack Fort Eban Emael. Although gliders had never been
used in combat before, the innovative use of these gliders
allowed the Germans to surprise the Belgians. This element
of surprise allowed the Germans to complete their mission to
destroy the guns threatening the advance of German
conventional forces. To improve shooting accuracy of Army
Special Forces personnel during the Son Tay mission, they
used an innovative new low light scope. This scope improved
shooting accuracy by 60 percent and was crucial to the
success of the mission.
In all of these cases simplicity was achieved with
either good intelligence or innovation. McRaven emphasizes
that his examples of simplicity are most evident during the
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execution phase of a mission, but they must be considered
during the planning phase as well. If a plan is simple it
will have a greater chance to succeed.
McRaven's second principle is security. By security
McRaven is referring to the means by which specifics of a
mission are kept secret from the enemy. McRaven feels that
it is not so much that an operation is going to occur that
must be kept secure, but more the timing and means of
insertion that must be kept secure from the enemy. Security
is important because it prevents the enemy from gaining an
advantage. McRaven observes that in almost all of the cases
he studied the enemy was prepared for the types of attacks
that occurred. What they were not prepared for was the time
and method. Whether it was an insertion by mini submarine
or glider, tight security kept the enemy ignorant as to the
specifics of the mission. In each case security contributed
to surprise by the assaulting force. This in turn
contributed to success. McRaven emphasizes that security
that is tight but does not interfere with the mission allows
special operations forces to achieve relative superiority.
Relative superiority is achieved because it prevents the
enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage that might allow
26
the enemy to prepare a surprise of their own to impede the
mission.
McRaven's third principle is repetition. Repetition
during the preparation phase of a mission is seen by McRaven
as being indispensable in eliminating mistakes to achieve
success. He says that at least one, and preferably two full
dress rehearsals prior to the mission are essential to hone
tactical skills and test any new tactics or equipment
innovated for the mission. For example, he attributes the
success of the air force task group involved in the Son Tay
raid to repetition. During this raid they were required to
fly extremely tight formations with the UH-1H and the C-130
aircraft. This formation was only possible after hundreds
of hours of practice. During the operation to attack the
German battle ship Tirpitz, rehearsals were not used to
practice towing the small dry submersibles by conventional
submarines. On the actual towing, the manila towline broke
and one mini submarine sunk and another was damaged.
Admiral Godfrey Place is quoted as saying, "If only we had
towed the boats for the full eight days we might have known
that the manila lines would break." McRaven makes the point
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that repetition hones both individual and unit skills, while
full dress rehearsals uncover any weaknesses in a plan.
McRaven's fourth principle is surprise. As has been
mentioned before, McRaven points out that special forces
often do not have the luxury to attack an enemy when and
where he is unprepared. Therefore special operations forces
must use surprise not to catch an enemy unprepared, but off
guard. McRaven writes that surprise by special operations
forces is accomplished through deception, timing, and taking
advantage of the enemy's vulnerabilities. During the raid
on Son Tay, the navy's Carrier task Force 77 conducted a
diversionary strike to divert attention away from the raid.
This diversion is credited with allowing the heliborne raid
force to penetrate North Vietnam's air defense and land
undetected in the POW camp. In most special operations
deception is best used to delay action by the enemy.
McRaven uses the Entebbe raid as an example . He writes that
when the Israelis assaulted the Entebbe Airport, they used a
Mercedes sedan similar to ones used by Ugandan dignitaries
to momentarily delay action by the Ugandan guards. Skorzeny
took an Italian general with him when he rescued Mussolini.
McRaven quotes Skorzeny as saying that the Italian general's
28
"mere presence would probably serve to create certain
confusion. .. a sort of hesitation which would prevent them
form resisting immediately or from assassinating the Duce .
"
In this case the deception did cause confusion among the
guards and gave Skorzeny enough time to reach Mussolini.
McRaven states that the time of attack is another key
to gaining surprise. Contrary to conventional thought, the
best time to attack may not always be at night. McRaven
points this out in recounting several special operations
missions that achieved a great deal of surprise despite
being carried out during daylight hours. Skorzeny landed at
1400. His intent was to time this landing with the guards
just finishing lunch. He believed they would be less alert
at this time. The midget submarine that destroyed the
Tirpitz attacked in the morning. This time was chosen to
coincide with British intelligence reports that said that
the Tirpitz radar would be down for repairs at this time.
McRaven closes his discussion of surprise by warning
tacticians to not place all of their emphasis on surprise.
McRaven makes the point that surprise is useless and
unachievable without his other principles. He says that
surprise is essential, but not the only answer. In order to
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achieve relative superiority all principles must be
considered and applied properly.
McRaven's fifth principle is speed. McRaven's view of
speed as it relates to special operations is simple. He
states in special operations the concept of speed means to
get to your objective as fast as possible. This principle
is important because it limits vulnerability and thus
increases opportunity to achieve relative superiority.
McRaven believes that over time the frictions of war work
only against the special operations forces and not against
the defensive enemy.
McRaven cites his two case studies involving submarine
attacks to demonstrate his point. During the Tirpitz attack
many problems began to arise as time progressed. During the
transit across the North Atlantic, the mini submarine began
to have electrical and ballast problems. Because time was
so critical the submarine commander, Lt . Don Cameron,
decided not to use his planned and more clandestine route to
the target, but chose instead to surface and make a mad
dash to the Tirpitz. In this case, the submarine commander
was clearly more concerned with time than even the
possibility of being seen by the enemy.
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During the Italian attack at Alexandria, time was of
greater concern than the enemy as well. Because the divers
who operated the Italian torpedo were exposed to such
extreme conditions of cold, they knew that they had to limit
their exposure. Because Durand de la Penne worked quickly
to place his explosives before the effects of the cold
overcame him, he was able to achieve success. McRaven
states that in both of these cases, the enemy was not a
factor, but time was still an obstacle to the success of the
mission.
To further make his point, McRaven writes that of the
successful missions that he analyzed, only the Saint-Nazaire
raid took longer than thirty minutes to achieve relative
superiority. In most of his cases relative superiority was
achieved in five minutes and the missions lasted only thirty
minutes. McRaven' s position is that because special
operations forces are generally lightly armed in order to
gain surprise and speed, they are unable to successfully
continue sustained engagements with the enemy. During the
attack at Saint-Nazaire when the targets increased from
three to eleven, this required the commandos to be ashore
longer. This in turn directly impacted their time of
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vulnerability, and in turn contributed to mission failure.
McRaven believes that relative superiority can be gained
primarily because an attacking special operations force
moves with such speed that the enemy's reaction is not an
overriding factor.
McRaven' s last principle is purpose. McRaven defines
purpose as understanding and then executing the prime
objective of the mission regardless of emerging obstacles or
opportunities. McRaven gives two aspects of this principle.
First, the purpose must be clearly defined in the mission
statement. Care must be given to state the mission so that
even in the heat of battle all individuals understand what
the primary objective is. During the Tirpitz attack, the
submarine commander's mission statement said that if his
craft was still under power and equipped with at least one
side charge, then he was to attack. Despite numerous other
problems with the submarine, his craft still had the
required operational capabilities and he thus carried out
his objective. During the assault on the British fleet in
Alexandria, two of the Italian frogmen found themselves
under the wrong enemy vessel . Although destroying the ship
would have been acceptable, they further risked their lives
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to continue on to the proper target. It is McRaven's
contention that in both of these cases the men had clearly-
defined orders that directed their actions in the heat of
battle and focused their efforts on what was important.
The second aspect of purpose is personal commitment.
McRaven quotes General Joshua Shani the air commander at
Entebbe as saying after the raid, "We were absolutely
committed to seeing the task completed..." Captain Skorzeny
is quoted as saying, "When a man is moved by pure enthusiasm
and by the conviction that he is risking his life in a noble
cause... he provides the essential element for success."
McRaven warns that in an age of high technology and Jedi
Knights we often overlook the need for personal involvement,
but we do so at our own risk.
McRaven concludes his book by stating his position that
his theory explains why special operations succeed. His
theory supports his belief that special operations forces
are able to achieve relative superiority over the enemy if
they prepare a simple plan, which is carefully concealed,
repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with
surprise, speed and purpose. McRaven concedes that his
theory of relative superiority does not guarantee success,
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but boldly concludes that no special operation can succeed
without it . His six principles support his view that
relative superiority can and should be achieved quickly and
that the mission must be one such that the forces limit
their time of vulnerability. This vulnerability, being
related to relative superiority, is a function of simplicity
(innovation and intelligence), security, and surprise. He
writes that time is a function of speed; and mission
completion is related to limiting the objectives and
motivating the soldiers.
In summary, McRaven states that what allows special
operations to succeed is their ability to effectively use
his principles of special operations. The better his
principles are integrated the greater the relative
superiority. By using his principles, forces can also
reduce their vulnerability. McRaven believes it is this
combination of gaining relative superiority while reducing
vulnerability, that can be achieved through his six
principles. These principles, according to McRaven, explain
why special operations can succeed.
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C. COMPARISON
A direct comparison of these two theories yields very
little contradictions and many similarities. Of course the
questions that each were trying to answer seem very
different on the surface, but are actually complementary.
While Vandenbroucke seeks to explain why U.S. special
operations fail, one can use this information to in fact
tell how special operations can succeed. If Vandenbroucke'
s
reasons for failure are known up front and compensated for
in the planning end execution of an operation, then it
follows that this theory could be used to explain how
special operations can succeed. How special operations
succeed in turn was the purpose of McRaven's analysis.
Using this line of reasoning one would expect that both
theories should have much in common.
Indeed these theories do have much in common. The
differences are really only ones of terminology and
different levels of analysis. Vandenbroucke examines his
cases more from the strategic level of a planner and
authorizing official. McRaven examines his cases from a
tactical level of planner and executor. Many of their ideas
overlap. While Vandenbroucke cites an intelligence failure,
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especially in the areas of HUMINT, as a reason for failure,
McRaven states that his principle of simplicity is a
function of good intelligence. In fact, in McRaven'
s
examples of the Israeli rescue operation and the midget
submarine attack on the Tirpitz, information such as weapon
types and disposition of guards as in the Israeli case, and
maintenance schedules as in the Tirpitz case, could only be
gained through HUMINT. So one can conclude that the HUMINT
capabilities in McRaven' s cases were significant to their
success, thus also supporting Vandenbroucke ' s theory.
Similarly, through the use of McRaven' s principles of
simplicity, and repetition
,
many of Vandenbrouckes problems
of coordination are supported. McRaven states that
simplicity reduces the problems associated with
coordination. Also, Vandenbroucke himself makes the case
for repetition and rehearsals when he acknowledges that in
the Son Tay raid many of the problems of coordination were
solved through the many rehearsals conducted.
Vandenbroucke also makes the case for a few other of
McRaven' s principles in reference to generalities about
special operations. Vandenbroucke says that strategic
special operators must prevail through speed, shock,
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surprise, and superior skill. Two of McRaven's principles;
speed and surprise are mentioned verbatim.
Vandenbroucke additionally states that excessive
secrecy impedes coordination in special operations. McRaven
has similar thoughts as he also warns that although he
supports the principle of security, it must not be enforced
to the detriment of the operation. Additionally,
Vandenbroucke states that with the inception of USSOCOM,
many of his problems appear to be solved. Poor
coordination, according to Vandenbroucke, were in fact not a
problem in operation Just Cause in Panama and in the Gulf
War. Both testament to USSOCOM' s positive influence.
Vandenbroucke ' s ideas of inadequate advice to decision
makers, wishful thinking by decision makers, and
micromanegement of the execution of special operations
missions all can be resolved through McRaven's principle of
purpose given by these decision makers through a clear
mission statement. USSOCOM can then step in to advise
decision makers accurately as to the capabilities and
options for the use of special operations.
In conclusion, the theories brought forward by
Vandenbroucke and McRaven appear to be very similar. They
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often use many of the same general ideas to support their
theories. Combined, these theories appear to complement and
support each other. On the surface these theories would
seem to provide a comprehensive guide to all participants in
a special operation. Vandenbroucke as a guide primarily to
decision makers and planners, and McRaven as a guide to
planners and operators. If these theories are right,
combined they may provide a comprehensive, top down guide in
all levels of special operations from granting authorization
to planning and execution. The next question is to see how






To test these theories, three recent Navy SEAL Special
Operations missions will be examined. Operations conducted
in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War will be analyzed.
These operations were chosen primarily because they were
conducted after the missions that Vandenbroucke and McRaven
examined. As the military in general has undergone many
changes over the years, it may be that so have special
operations. Examining more recent operations is the one way
to test the relevance of these theories for future
operations
.
Each analysis will begin with background information to
demonstrate the process that brought about the involvement
of SEALs in these operations. The cases will then be
divided into four sections. The first section will provide
the details of the preparation phase of each mission. The
second section will be an assessment of that phase in terms
of Vandenbroucke' s and McRaven' s theories. Specifically,
Vandenbroucke ' s elements of poor intelligence, poor
cooperation and coordination, inadequate advice and
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information to decision makers, wishful thinking, and
micromanagement from outside the theater will be examined as
they apply to this phase. Similarly, McRaven's elements of
simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and
purpose will be applied to determine their relevance to the
preparation phase of that mission. The third section will
be the execution phase followed by the fourth section which
will be further analysis in terms of Vandenbroucke and
McRaven
.
The objective is to test Vandenbroucke ' s and McRaven's
theories against the case evidence to determine the outcome
of these missions. Additionally, any elements not included
in these theories, but having significance to the outcome of
the mission, should be revealed. The end result will be a
comprehensive theory that can be applied to the preparation
and execution of future special operations missions.
B. GRENADA: OPERATION URGENT FURY3
1 . Backround
The small island of Grenada was under British rule
until given its independence in 1974 . Sir Eric Gairy was
Unless otherwise noted, information pertaining to this mission was drawn primarily from Naval Special
Warfare Command Lessons Learned from operation URGENT FURY.
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installed as the island's first prime minister. Sir Gairy's
rule was characterized by corruption and the use of strong
arm tactics to enforce his political position over potential
opponents. In March 1979, Maurice Bishop, a political rival
of Gairy, overthrew the tyrannical government in a bloodless
coup. After taking his place as the new leader and
installing himself as the head of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government (PRG) of Grenada, Bishop soon
turned to Cuba to help solve his country's financial
problems. Bishop formed a new political party and named it
the New Jewel Movement, Jewel being an acronym standing for
Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation.
Grenada's growing involvement with Cuba and the Soviet Union
over the next four years brought Grenada into conflict with
the United States' interests in the area. An ambitious
construction project to build a nine thousand foot runway on
Grenada was begun in 1979. Built primarily by Cuban
workers, the stated purpose of the airport was to increase
tourism. The United States suspected that the runway was
not purely commercial in nature and in fact had military
implications. Later, captured documents showed that Cuba
did indeed intend to use the runway as a staging area for
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shipping troops to Africa as well as a refueling stop for
Soviet aircraft going to Nicaragua.
Most of the aid that Grenada received from Cuba went to
Grenada's military. As a result, Grenada's People's
Revolutionary Armed Forces (PRAF) outnumbered the military
forces of all the other eastern Caribbean nations combined
by 1983. Bishop, disappointed with the economic assistance
he was already receiving, wanted to turn to the Western
governments to solicit even more assistance for his country.
This was in direct conflict with the wishes of his Deputy
Prime Minister, Bernard Coard. Coard led a faction of the
New Jewel movement that demanded a faster conversion of
Grenada in to a true Marxist state. On October 13, 1983,
Coard, with the backing of the military, ordered Bishop out
of office and had him placed under arrest by the authority
of Coard' s People's Revolutionary Army (PRA)
.
The occurrences on Grenada seriously concerned the U.S.
government. In reaction to this concern, on October 13,
1983, an interagency group meeting at the State Department
was held to discuss the situation. Of primary concern was
protecting the lives of some one thousand American citizens
living and working on Grenada, the majority of whom were
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students or faculty at the Saint George's University Medical
School. On October 14, the National Security Council
ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to plan a
nonpermissive evacuation of all U.S. citizens on Grenada.
Since Grenada is an island, the JCS ordered Admiral Wesley
McDonald, Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT) to draft
the required proposal.
On October 18 two naval task forces left the United
States for their assignments in the Mediterranean. The
first was Task Force 124, containing the helicopter carrier
Guam, and the Amphibious Squadron 4 (PHIBRON FOUR)
,
consisting of four landing ships. PHIBRON FOUR carried
1,700 combat ready marines of the 22nd Marine Amphibious
Unit (MAU) . Task Force 124 was going to Beirut, Lebanon, to
relieve the 24th MAU. Also leaving for its deployment to
the Mediterranean was the Independence Carrier Battle Group
made up of the aircraft carrier Independence and her escort
of cruisers and destroyers.
On October 19, Grenadan Foreign Minister Unison
Whiteman returned to Grenada from a visit to the United
Nations. After arriving in Grenada, Whiteman began
gathering supporters of Bishop in hopes of affecting his
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release. Supporters began gathering in the streets to
listen to Whiteman's pleas. As the crowd grew they decided
to go to where Bishop was being held and obtain his release
themselves. Faced with the large crowd of demonstrators,
the few guards standing watch over Bishop gave way and
Bishop was released to welcome his crowd of supporters that
had by this time grown to thousands. Returning to Saint
George's, Bishop moved on toward Fort Rupert, where he and
his supporters forced their way inside. As Bishop was
greeting several of his ministers who had been held at the
fort, three armored personnel carriers containing PRA
soldiers arrived. The officer in charge of the troops
ordered them to open fire into the crowd, hitting over one
hundred Grenadians and killing more than fifty. Afterwards,
Bishop, four of his ministers, and three of his most
prominent supporters were taken into the interior court at
Fort Rupert and shot
.
The nearest U.S. diplomatic post to Grenada was at
Bridgetown in Barbados. The American counsel stationed
there, Ambassador Bish, contacted the State Department
immediately upon hearing of the events on Grenada. Bish
stated that the situation was serious and that there
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"appeared to be imminent danger to U.S. citizens resident on
Grenada." Bish recommended an emergency evacuation of all
U.S. citizens from Grenada.
On the evening of October 19, the JCS sent a warning
order to CINCLANT to prepare for a noncombatant evacuation
of Grenada. A request was also sent to the Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC) to prepare a contingency plan for
the evacuation of Grenada by Special Forces. Both groups
were to present their plans to the JCS the next morning.
Because of conflicting intelligence on the size and
disposition of opposing forces on Grenada the two plans
varied greatly. JSOC, basing its plan on the assumption
that there were only 250 Cubans and 300 Grenadians under
arms proposed to conduct the evacuation using only Special
Forces. CINCLANT' s plan, based on a larger assessment of
the opposition forces proposed using only Marines in an
amphibious landing. After much heated debate the final plan
was for a compromise operation. In the initial assault the
Rangers and Special Forces would take the southern half of
the island and the Marines would take the northern half.
The JCS decided that the operation would be commanded
by the Navy. U.S. Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia,
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was ordered to set up a command group immediately with
CINCLANT having overall command of the operation. Once the
decision was made to go ahead with the operation and produce
detailed plans, JCS ordered that complete operational
security (OPSEC) be maintained at all levels. This strict
order, or rather the way it was implemented, was later
blamed for what has been described as inadequate planning.
The Independence Carrier Battle Group and Task Force 124
received orders at 0300 on October 21 to steam to a position
just off the coast of Grenada and await further orders. If
no further orders were received by October 24, the units
were to continue on to their original assignments. No
further information was given and the forces had no
specifics on what awaited them.
On October 22, two State Department officials went to
Grenada to assess the situation. What they saw supported
what was reported by Ambassador Bish. The next day the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States met and decided to
ask the United States for aid in restoring order on Grenada.
On October 24, Tom Adams, the Prime Minister of Barbados,
reported being contacted by Governor General Sir Paul Scoon.
Scoon had been personally appointed as the representative of
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Queen Elizabeth on Grenada in 1978. Most Grenadians still
considered Queen Elizabeth to be the official head of state.
Scoon had been tolerated as a figure head by Bishop's
government. When Coard came into power, Scoon was virtually
imprisoned at the Government House, the Governor's mansion
at Saint George . Scoon had contacted Adams by sending a
written request for help in restoring order and for
protection for himself and his staff. Since the United
States did not recognize Coard' s Revolutionary Military
Council as the true government of Grenada, they considered
Scoon' s request as an official request for U.S. aid.
2 . Preparatory Phase
Plans for invading Grenada had already been formulated
by CINCLANT, and JSOC had been directed to develop plans
that involved both Delta Force and Navy SEALs . Adding to
the planning difficulty was the lack of current
intelligence. Even though there were hundreds of U.S.
citizens already on Grenada, there was not one CIA agent on
the island who could be used as a HUMINT source 4 . The
operation was, for the most part, planned by CINCLANT over
Vandenbroucke, L.S., Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, p.
170, Oxford University Press, 1993.
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an extended weekend and based on fairly general guidance
provided by the JCS . It was executed, with minimum further
planning, two days later by a hastily assembled Joint Task
Force (JTF) which had little or no advance warning or
opportunity for coordination prior to H-Hour. The plan
called for the use of elements from SEAL Teams 4 and 6,
Delta Force, the 1st and 2nd Ranger Battalions, 82nd
Airborne Division, the 1st Special Operations Wing of the
Air Force, and the 22nd MAU. This diverse force was
especially significant because it represented the first time
all four services would be operating together since the
Vietnam War.
The invasion was given the code name Operation URGENT
FURY and placed under the command of Vice Admiral Metcalf.





A Delta element would parachute in before dawn and
secure the airfield at Port Salines. Delta would clear the
runway and provide security for the Rangers
.
2 Another Delta element would attack the Richmond
Hill prison and free the civil servants and other citizens
being held there.
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3 . A SEAL element from SEAL Team 6 would rescue




A platoon from SEAL Team 4 would capture the Radio
Free Grenada station and keep it off the air until it could
be used by U.S. forces.
5 Another platoon from SEAL Team 4 would insert an
Air Force Combat Control Team (CCT) at the Port Salines
area
.
Although there were continuing changes to the forces
assigned to these tasks, the primary SEAL mission was the
rescue of Governor General Sir Paul Scoon and his staff.
Since the U.S. considered him to be the legitimate
government authority, his rescue was seen as being of
extreme importance. The map on the following page shows the
location of the Governor General's house in relation to the
rest of the island. Originally a platoon from SEAL Team 4
and a Marine Recon Platoon were tasked with the mission.
The plan involving these forces included using the Marines
with LAAW rockets supplied by the SEALs to act as a blocking
force around the governor's mansion. The SEALs, equipped





Figure 1. Map of Grenada. From Payne, A. .GRENADA, Revolution and
Invasion, Croom Helm Ltd., 1984, p. 3.
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launchers, fragmentation grenades, and an antitank rocket,
would then secure the governor and his staff. At the last
minute SEAL Team 6 was chosen. SEAL Team 6 is primarily a
counterterrorist force that had only recently been
established. Greg Walker, in his book At the Hurricane's
Eye , asserts that the last minute change was by direction of
the chairman of the JCS who wanted the newly formed SEAL
Team 6 to be "bloodied." Regardless of the reason, the
members of SEAL Team 6 who conducted the mission had less
than 72 hours from their time of recall to H-Hour. In
addition, these SEALs planned to carry far less fire power
than the other SEALs, apparently expecting only minimal
opposition. Team 6 SEALs planned to split their team into
two elements aboard two separate helicopters. H-Hour was
chosen so that the insertion could be conducted under the
cover of darkness. Upon flying to the General's residence,
the SEALs would then fastrope into the compound, a method in
which each man slides unattached down a thick rope allowing
for rapid deployment of forces . They would then secure
General Scoon and his staff and wait until being relieved by
a follow-on force of Rangers.
5
Walker, G., At The Hurricane's Eye, p. 122, Ballantine Books, 1994.
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The whole mission was planned to be over within four
hours. The time crunch, however, prevented them from
conducting any rehearsals and greatly shortened the normal
planning time of 96-120 hours that SEAL doctrine states is
necessary to adequately plan and prepare for a mission.
Lessons learned from the mission also state that various
aspects of standard SEAL planning procedures were not
considered during the planning for this mission.
Specifically such oversights included a fire support plan,
an escape and evasion plan, a link-up plan and alternate or
contingency plans. Also during planning stages while at
Fort Bragg North Carolina, there were numerous changes to
the communications plan. According to one official report,
it is not clear whether or not there was a published
Communications and Electronics Operating Instruction (CEOI)
that is normally required for all military operations.
Assertions have been made that both frequencies and
satellite information that should have been contained in the
CEOI were changed without advising the operational forces.
This coupled with constant changes in tasking, lack of
intelligence, and numerous delays were already causing
considerable confusion before the mission even began.
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3 . Preparatory Phase Analysis
Already many elements of both Vandenbroucke ' s and
McRaven's theories can be addressed. Most glaring of
Vandenbroucke ' s key elements was intelligence shortfalls.
Because not one HUMINT source was available, very little
information was known about the actual forces at the Scoon
residence, the layout of the compound, or the reaction
forces that might be alerted to the assault. Additionally,
the entire invasion plan has been cited as allowing for
little or no advance warning or opportunity for coordination
by the JTF in charge. If this problem is still prevalent
during the execution phase, this would be identified by
Vandenbroucke as a source of poor coordination that he says
contributes to failure.
Second, the decision to use SEAL Team 6, primarily a
counterterrorist force, on this mission was questioned by
many prior to and after the operation. Obviously this begs
the question of what advice was being given to the JCS on
the mission and capabilities of this specialized force. In
fact, one of the lessons learned from the operation was that
conventional forces were unfamiliar with the capabilities
and limitations of SEALs . This report also concludes that
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it is imperative that Naval Special Warfare (NSW) unit
leaders make every effort possible to familiarize their
conventional forces commanders with NSW unit capabilities
and limitations. These statements support Vandenbroucke'
s
concern that senior military leaders were given inadequate
information.
Finally, Vandenbroucke' s theory on "wishful thinking"
is demonstrated in the lack of concern over the poor
intelligence available. There was no accurate intelligence
on resistance forces nor even accurate maps of the General's
compound. All of this was apparently wished away as not
being essential to conduct the mission, even though standard
SEAL mission planning guidance contains these kinds of
planning criteria. Additionally, the chance that they might
encounter resistance was wished away as demonstrated by the
lack of a fire support plan or escape and evasion plan
should things go wrong.
So far, all but one of Vandenbroucke ' s elements have
been identified as having occurred during the preparatory
phase of this mission. Even Vandenbroucke ' s last element,
micromanagement from outside the theater of operations, is
Naval Special Warfare Command Lessons Learned, Operation URGENT FURY, p. 8-2.
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quite possibly illustrated in the last minute change by the
JCS to task SEAL Team 6 instead of the already tasked SEAL
Platoon floating off Grenada. Although this is
micromanagement , it is not strictly speaking an example of
"over control" of the execution phase of the operation that
Vandenbroucke identifies. We must examine the execution
phase of the Grenada operation to conclusively test this
final element of Vandenbroucke ' s theory.
In terms of McRaven's theory, many problems can also be
identified in the preparatory phase of this mission. The
elements of simplicity and surprise have properly been
accounted for in the plan for this mission. The plan is
simple. The team is simply planning to fly in, secure Scoon
and his staff, and await relief. They are planning to go in
by cover of darkness to achieve surprise. If all goes as
planned, these two elements seem to be properly addressed.
The remaining four elements of McRaven's theory; speed,
security, repetition, and purpose, are not properly
addressed, however. The mission plan disregards speed in
that the mission is to last at least four hours. McRaven
states that in most special operations success depends on
seconds and minutes, not hours. In regards to security,
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McRaven would say that the concern for security was proper,
but that the concerns for security must not hamper mission
planning, which is clearly the case here. The severe
compartmentalization required to satisfy the OPSEC order was
a problem throughout the preparatory phase. One official
document states that "Initial planning for the operation
called for it to be a SOF operation, but as events unfolded
other Army and Marine units became involved and the SOF plan
was co-opted. Integration of SOF and conventional units was
poor from the start and severely hampered by excessive
operational security." If the restrictions imposed by the
strict OPSEC requirements could have been worked out perhaps
proper fire support and contingency plans could have been
planned for in this mission.
Similarly, McRaven' s element of repetition was
completely violated. Regardless of whether there was enough
time or intelligence to conduct proper rehearsals, the fact
is that no rehearsals were conducted. The last element of
purpose has already been shown to be a potential problem as
well. As has been shown, there is evidence that the tasking
for the mission changed several times while the team was
Naval Special Warfare Command Lessons Learned, Operation URGENT FURY, p. 8-1.
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planning for the mission. Additionally, lessons learned
state that there existed a problem for many of the SOF
missions, including this one, in regards to the absence of a
detailed mission statement to guide the planning process.
In summary, all but one of Vandenbroucke' s elements for
the lack of success of U.S. special operations can be
identified during the preparatory phase of this mission.
Vandenbroucke ' s last element, micromanagement outside the
theater of operations has arguably also been identified, but
further analysis of the execution phase is required. As for
McRaven, two of McRaven's elements for the successful
conduct of special operations have been planned for, and
four have not. Simplicity and surprise have been planned
for. Speed, security, repetition, and purpose represented a
potential problem. According to McRaven, if even one these
elements of success is not adhered to, the mission will
invariably encounter some degree of failure. Examining the
execution phase will reveal whether or not this was true for
the rescue of Governor General Scoon and his staff.
4 . Execution Phase
SEAL Team 6 was ordered to go in during the early
morning hours of October 25. The original plan called for
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the SEALs to insert by helicopter during the night, but
delays caused the SEALs to have to insert during daylight
hours. Some time before 0600, prior to the SEALs insertion,
a call to arms to repel the U.S. invasion could be heard
being broadcast over Radio Free Grenada. Surprise was lost.
The force was divided into two elements, each on a separate
Blackhawk helicopter. As the helicopters flew over the
compound they were met by waiting PRA forces who immediately
opened fire on the helicopters. Intelligence had not
predicted such resistance and in addition to this problem,
the helicopters had some difficulty locating an area free of
power lines that would be suitable for inserting the SEALs.
On the following page is a diagram depicting the drawing
used by the SEALs to plan their assault (note the lack of
critical details such as power lines and gradient) . This
information was unavailable because of the serious lack of
HUMINT during the entire invasion. One senior officer,
Major General Hugh L. Cox stated, "...In the Grenada
operation, the human intelligence factor that can contribute
to mission success was not what it should have been, and we
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Figure 2. Sketch of compound. From Naval Special Warfare Command
Lessons Learned, Operation URGENT FURY.
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need to do a better job for the future in that particular
/, 8area .
"
The first Blackhawk helicopter carrying part of the
SEAL team arrived near the Governor's mansion and
immediately came under heavy fire from PRA and Cuban troops.
Despite being badly shot up the helicopter quickly dropped
its team of SEALs by fastrope and pulled away. Unknown to
the SEALs as they struck the ground, they found themselves
on a very steep hill and several lost their footing and
tumbled down the embankment. Scrambling to regain their
footing, thirteen SEALs fought their way across the lawn and
into the mansion. The second helicopter carrying the
remainder of the team was ordered away by the commander on
the ground. The SEALs quickly assessed the situation and
discovered that in the confusion of the insertion they had
forgotten their
long range radio and they had no backup. One of the lessons
learned from this mission was that during short flights,
[one should] not remove operational equipment . For longer
flights, always pass a two-minute stand-by before the final
Vandenbroucke, L.S., Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, p.
170, Oxford University Press, 1993.
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approach into the target area. This allows for everyone to
make final preparations before the actual insertion.
The SEALs quickly found Governor General Scoon and
secured him in a safe location. They then positioned
themselves inside the mansion so that they had interlocking
fields of fire surrounding the governor's mansion. The only
long range weapon that the SEALs had was a G3 SG/1 sniper
rifle. Using this rifle, one SEAL rotated around the
various positions and was able to hit any enemy troops that
were foolish enough to show themselves. The PRA commander,
realizing the difficulty of approaching the mansion decided
to wait for reinforcements, including three BTR-60PB armored
personnel carriers.
The loss of the long range radio limited the SEALs
ability to communicate with the rest of the U.S. troops in
the area. While the SEALs were deciding their next move,
the phone rang. Scoon answered it and found himself talking
to the local police chief. The police chief asked, "How are
they (the SEALs) armed?" Scoon' s response was, "they are
armed to the teeth!" This simple response is credited with
serving as an excellent deception that likely served as a
9
Dockery, K., SEALS in Action, p. 268, Bill Fawcett & Associates, 1991.
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deterrent to the PRA in assaulting the mansion and
overwhelming the SEALs . This fortuitous conversation also
gave the SEALs the idea to use the phone system to establish
communications with outside forces. Meanwhile the other
SEALs who were on the second helicopter established a
communications relay on a nearby hill using Motorola MX-360s
which the SEALs inside the mansion possessed. The fix was
not perfect, but at least they now had communications.
The SEALs were able to inform Admiral Metcalf of their
precarious situation. Admiral Metcalf immediately sent two
AH- IT SeaCobra helicopter gunships to give the SEALs much
needed air cover. Unfortunately, both of the helicopters
were shot down by heavy fire from multiple 23 -mm cannons as
well as 14.5-mm rounds from a hidden BTR-60. After the
SeaCobras were shot down, the PRA commander decided to
assault the mansion. An AC- 13 Spectre gunship arrived just
as the attack was beginning. The AC- 13 immediately
destroyed one of the BTR-60PBS and stopped the attack. The
AC-130 then remained on station for the rest of the day,
circling above the mansion, just beyond the range of ground
based antiaircraft guns. Metcalf also ordered a full scale
air assault to destroy the antiaircraft guns that had been
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responsible for the downing of the SeaCobras . The PRA
contented itself with repeated attacks against the SEALs
from a distance, utilizing grenades and stand off weapons.
During the night of October 25, Admiral Metcalf ordered
the LST Manitowoc, carrying Marine Company Golf, to steam
around the island and land its men at Saint George where
they were then to make their way to the mansion to relieve
the SEALs. In addition to these Marines, they were also
joined by Fox company who were already on the island and
were transported by helicopter to link up with Golf company.
Golf company came ashore at Grand Mai Bay at 0400.
Reinforced by five M60A1 tanks landed by the LSD Fort
Snelling, and joined by Fox company, the combined Marine
team made their way to rescue the trapped SEALs
.
One Grenadian armored personnel carrier tried to stop
the Marines but was quickly destroyed by one of the M60Als.
With close air support from Navy attack air craft from the
Independence, Golf company relieved the exhausted and
thankful SEALs at 0712. The SEALs mission had lasted almost
24 hours instead of the planned 4 hours. Governor General
Scoon, his staff, and the SEALs were quickly evacuated by
helicopter to an awaiting ship offshore.
63
5. Execution Phase Analysis
Overall, Operation URGENT FURY was considered to be a
success. All military objectives were accomplished , albeit
not always according to plan. For Naval Special Warfare,
however, the operation was something less than a success.
The SEALs were not prepared, and although they displayed
courage and resourcefulness in the face of great personal
risk, they underestimated the enemy and almost had a
disaster on their hands. The Governor General and his staff
were rescued, not by the SEALs, but by the Marines. The
SEALs did not have adequate intelligence or time to properly
plan for the mission. In addition, the lack of reliable
information provided to commanders regarding the
capabilities of the SEALs resulted in their being misused.
The bottom line, however, is that the SEALs had a poor plan.
As has been shown already, using Vandenbroucke ' s theory
one can identify several important problems in the
preparation phase of this mission. As indicated earlier,
intelligence was extremely poor. Lack of intelligence on
the layout of the compound resulted in a poor choice for the
landing zone. Lack of intelligence on surrounding enemy
forces prevented the team from being prepared for the stiff
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resistance they encountered. Wishful thinking on the part
of the SEALs could be the reason that they underestimated
potential enemy strength. Their plan was poor and lacked
sufficient contingencies because they wished the possibility
of problems away.
Although the preparatory phase of the mission indicated
the possibility of poor coordination, the execution phase
actually displayed extremely good coordination. Once the
problems with communications were resolved, the SEALs were
able to coordinate and direct unplanned fire support that in
all likelihood saved themselves and the Governor General.
In addition, the rescue of the SEALs and the governor by the
Marines displayed excellent operational coordination.
Finally, there seems to be no indication that this mission
displayed any micromanagement from outside the theater of
operations during the execution phase of the operation.
Vandenbroucke ' s elements of poor intelligence, poor
advice to decision makers and wishful thinking are all
prevalent in this mission; whereas Vandenbroucke ' s elements
of poor coordination and micromanagement are not apparent.
Looking at the execution phase in McRaven's terms, we
can see many problems as well . Surprise was lost as the
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SEALs conducted a near daylight assault against an already-
alerted enemy because of poor security. The need for speed,
in the end, was further acerbated when the mission lasted 24
hours instead of the planned 4 hours. Rehearsals were not
conducted and perhaps repetition would have prevented
mission critical equipment, such as a long range radio, from
being left on the helicopter. Simplicity was planned for,
but actually was not executed in that the mission evolved
into the use of several fire support platforms and multiple
forces. The mission actually became increasingly
complicated as it unfolded, but was still successful because
of these added complications. The complication of the
mission, however, was on the side of conventional forces
coordinating the rescue, not by special operations forces
conducting the mission.
If we consider only the special operations part of this
mission, not the conventional force rescue, this mission
largely failed, as McRaven's theory would have predicted.
McRaven states that if even one of his elements is
overlooked the mission can be expected to suffer at least
some degree of failure. Since these SEALs did not plan on
relying on being rescued by Marines, it is safe to say that
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they failed. Surprise, speed, security, and repetition were
all a problem during the execution phase of this mission.
Perhaps if these elements of McRaven's theory had been
adhered to, the mission would have been successful. As it
stands, however, McRaven's theory seems to at least help to
explain mission failure.
The real problem with this mission seems to be the poor
planning by the SEALs . For whatever reason, they forgot
many of the basics for any mission such as contingencies and
communications. In the face of unknowns due to poor
intelligence, McRaven says that one should use best
judgment. Perhaps a better way of stating it would be to
plan for the worst case scenario. If the SEALs had planned
for the possibility of greater resistance they would have
had greater firepower and would have had contingencies to
react to the opposition. At any rate, this mission was ill
conceived and poorly executed by the SEALs involved. One
would not expect elite forces to leave their radio on the
insertion platform. Communications are critical to any
mission. The fact that accomplishing the mission depended
on luck, ie. the use of existing phone lines to "call in the
calvary," only demonstrates poor planning.
67
This mission does show that even the best can have
problems with the basics. Move, shoot, and communicate are
the cornerstones of any successful operation. When in
doubt, one must have contingencies for the worst case
scenario. These ideas can be drawn from both
Vandenbroucke ' s and McRaven's broader theories, but their
importance to the success of any mission make them worthy of
stating specifically.
C. PANAMA: OPERATION JUST CAUSE10
1 . Background
From 196 8, when General Omar Torrijos Herrera seized
power in a coup d'etat, until Operation JUST CAUSE, Panama
had for all intents and purposes become a military
dictatorship. Omar Torrijos died in a mysterious plane
crash in August 1981 and Colonel Manuel Noriega, Torrijos'
chief intelligence officer, rose to power by outmaneuvering
his opponents within the National Guard. By August 1983,
Noriega had installed himself as leader of the newly named
Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF)
,
promoted himself to
Unless otherwise noted, information pertaining to this mission was drawn primarily from Naval Special
Warfare Command Lessons Learned from operation JUST CAUSE.
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General, and consolidated his hold on the country's
political and military institutions.
Noriega enforced his rule through repression and
corruption. The United States initially ignored Noriega's
abuse of power in exchange for his support of U.S. policy
initiatives in Central America. This changed when in
February of 1988 two separate U.S. federal grand juries
indicted Noriega on drug charges. After a failed coup
attempt by a small group of PDF officers, diplomatic
attempts were made to try to convince Noriega to relinquish
power. Noriega responded by increasing the repression of
his regime. President Reagan, in turn, responded by levying
economic sanctions against Panama.
Because of the worsening situation in Panama, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed the U.S. Southern Command
(USSOUTHCOM) to prepare a commander's estimate on how the
U.S. could intervene with military force to overthrow
General Noriega. The segment of the plan that detailed U.S.
offensive combat operations in Panama was called BLUE SPOON.
In May 1989, Noriega was elected President of Panama
through blatant vote fraud. In response to the election,
two parts of USSOUTHCOM' s plans were initiated: the
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reinforcement of SOUTHCOM and the evacuation of non-
combatant personnel.
On October 3, 1989 another attempt was made to
overthrow Noriega. This time the attempt was made by PDF
chief of security, Major Moises Giroldi. Giroldi asked for
but did not receive U.S. aid in his attempt. Consequently
the attempt failed. Having survived the attempt, Noriega
strengthened his position by purging the PDF of suspected
opponents. On December 15, 1989, Panama's National Assembly
declared Noriega the maximum leader for national liberation
and more importantly declared a state of war to exist
between Panama and the U.S.
The next day, December 16, a confrontation occurred
between U.S. and PDF personnel at a roadblock. At about
2100 hours that evening, PDF soldiers stopped a Navy SEAL
lieutenant and his wife. While their identities were being
checked, four American officers arrived at the roadblock.
Sensing the actions of the soldiers and the growing crowd as
hostile, the driver of one of the cars broke through the
roadblock. The PDF soldiers opened fire wounding one and
eventually killing another. Meanwhile, the SEAL, who was
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assigned to Special Boat Unit 26, and his wife were taken to
a local police station for questioning.
After an hour of questioning by police, a PDF major
arrived and led them away at gun point . They were taken to
the military headquarters for interrogation. Supervised by
the PDF major, soldiers beat and kicked the SEAL and slammed
his wife's head against a wall and threatened to rape her.
Even after severely beating the SEAL and the abuse to his
wife, neither of them would divulge any information other
than he operated boats on the canal. His captors then told
him they were going to kill him. The SEAL was led outside
in front of a firing squad. The orders, "ready, aim, fire!"
were given. None of the weapons fired. Unknown to the Seal
at the time, the weapons were not loaded. After several
more hours of interrogation, the SEAL and his wife were then
released.
2 . Preparatory Phase
Before midnight that same day, President Bush had been
briefed on the incident. After quietly stating, "enough is
enough," he sought advice from his senior advisors . With
the concurrence of General Powell, LTG Kelly (the JCS J3)
,
11
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and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, only one option was
presented. That option was Operation BLUE SPOON. President
Bush accepted the plan and ordered its implementation.
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney came up with the new name for
the operation, Operation JUST CAUSE.
The plan had three basic goals:
1. The quick neutralization or removal of any military
resistance to the U.S. forces. This was directed primarily
at the Panama Defense Force, but Noriega's "Dignity
Battalions" were also targeted.
2. The capture of General Noriega himself.
3. The installation of a stable, democratically
elected government and the restoration of order to the
country.
Initial planning for Operation JUST CAUSE had been
started in 1988. At that time USSOUTHCOM had asked for
assistance from U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
.
At the request, USSOCOM dispatched a planning team to Panama
that arrived on 13 March 1988. Among the planners were
three Naval Special Warfare planners: The Commanding
Officer, SEAL Team FOUR (ST-4) , and two staff planners from
Naval Special Warfare Group TWO (NSWG-2) . USCINCSO's
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(United States Commander in Chief Southern Command) initial
guidance to the assembled planners was to:
1. Interdict rather than attempt to destroy PDF
units
.
2. Minimize casualties and damage to Panamanian
installations
.
3. Capture, not kill, Noriega.
Working with Special Operations Command, Special Operations
Command South (SOCSO) , and Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama,
the planners drafted the SOF portion of BLUE SPOON within 3 6
hours. The original plan called for SOF forces to seize
seven command and control targets:
- the Comandancia (Noriega's headquarters)
- the PDF bases at Rio Hato and David
- the Paitilla Airfield
- Tocumen/Torri jos Airport
- PDF patrol boats in Balboa Harbor, and
- the Flamenco Island complex.
To achieve the surprise critical to the plan, H-Hour was




The plan was approved and issued by SOUTHCOM on 17
March 1988. The plan formalized Navy SOF's involvement in
the operation. The following month SOUTHCOM issued USCINCSO
OPORD 5-88 (BLUE SPOON) that detailed the Navy SOF missions.
These missions were:
1. Perform reconnaissance and surveillance on, and
isolate and contain PDF forces at Flemenco Island.
2
.
Seize/control or render inoperable patrol boats in
Balboa Harbor.
3. Perform reconnaissance and surveillance on Paitilla
airfield and deny the use of it to PDF forces.
Objections were made by several planners on whether the
Paitilla mission was appropriate for SEALs . SEALs seldom
operate tactically in more than one platoon, and often in
only squads of half that size. This mission however would
obviously require more than just one SEAL platoon. Despite
these objections and because no other viable options were
offered, the mission remained.
TF WHITE was designated as the Navy SOF Task Force.
Task Unit (TU) PAPA, of TF WHITE, was assigned the Paitilla
mission. The objectives of the mission were to conduct
reconnaissance and surveillance of Paitilla airfield,
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disable high value PDF aircraft, interdict aircraft
approaching or attempting to leave, be prepared to disable
other aircraft as required, and otherwise deny the PDF the
use of the airfield. During the spring of 1988 unit level
rehearsals were conducted at Fentress, a Navy auxiliary
airfield in Virginia. The plan was to land two SEAL
platoons by Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC) on Paitilla
airfield's seaward side. An SBU-26 patrol boat would be
used to escort ten CRRCs containing the SEALs and their
equipment. After coming ashore, both SEAL platoons were to
form in a staggered formation and quickly run up the side of
the runway just short of Noriega's hangar. Relying on
stealth and surprise, the SEALs were to overpower any
defenders and puncture the tires of Noriega's plane in
accordance with the current Rules of Engagement (ROE) . They
were then to form a defensive perimeter and hold the
airfield for four to five hours until conventional forces
would relieve them. This plan was simple enough if all
assumptions about the PDF resistance being minimal were
accurate. Despite seeming to be simple, the rehearsals
still brought out the difficulty of maneuvering two platoons
and maintaining command and control. It was decided
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therefore, to maneuver the platoons separately and only
bring them together if necessary. Commander, Naval Special
Warfare Group TWO, Captain Sandoz, ordered that rehearsals
be conducted every six months to iron out any problems.
In July 198 9, USSOCOM held a commanders conference to
review preparations conducted thus far. During this
conference General Lindsay, USCINCSOC, expressed two
concerns about the Paitilla mission. He felt that despite
the optimism felt by the Captain Sandoz, that two platoons
were enough, he believed that the force should be increased.
He also felt it would be wise to plan on holding the
airfield for more than the expected four to five hours until
reinforcements arrived. These changes were approved at a
SOUTHCOM meeting in mid November. Additionally, the ROE
were changed to allow more latitude in the use of force.
Concerning the Paitilla mission the changes now included:
1. Committing an additional platoon to the assault
force as a reserve against possible PDF resistance. The
total number of SEAL platoons was now three.
2
.
The tactics were altered to reflect the more
aggressive rules of engagement. To disable PDF aircraft,
the SEALs were now permitted to go beyond flattening the
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tires and could rely on their weapons, AT-4 rockets, M-16s,
and M-6 machine guns to damage the aircraft.
3. Gunfire support to the mission was increased. An
AC- 13 was assigned to support the force and a two-man USAF
Combat Controller Team (CCT) was designated to direct the
AC-130 gunfire.
A two man mortar element was also added. Additionally,
three two man reconnaissance teams were added to provide
early warning of any attempts by the PDF to provide
reinforcements to what was expected to be only four to six
guards at the airfield. Another concern was that as of 15
November 1989, all HUMINT on the target ceased as a result
of orders restricting movement of all Americans in Panama.
This same concern for HUMINT would be expressed in later
stages of mission planning.
From 12-15 December 1989, a major full dress rehearsal
of all SOF forces was conducted. To replicate Paitilla
airfield, NSWG-2 used a rural grass airfield at Navarre,
Florida, near Eglin AFB. Navarre had only a few light
aircraft and few buildings, this being a significant
contrast to Paitilla' s numerous aircraft and many buildings
and hangars. Despite this, the SEALs conducted two mock
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assaults. The planned assault force had by this time
expanded to over 60 personnel with the addition of a third
SEAL platoon, a mortar crew, and teams of Signal
Intelligence (SIGINT) , Pyschological Operations (PSYOPs)
,
Reconnaisance and Surveillance (R&S) , and CCT. The
rehearsal, though, consisted of only about 42 men. Although
only two platoons participated, to add realism one platoon
was split in two to simulate the third platoon. During the
rehearsal it was evident again that command and control was
exceedingly difficult. One SEAL platoon commander recalled,
ua number of times we could see people (the opposition
forces) moving. Okay, we need to go ahead and get on line
to engage them. . .Because the rules of engagement., if a
guy's not a threat, if you can't tell whether he has a
rifle, don't open up. It was never clear .. .Three times: on
line, off line, on line. Eventually we were just like, well
forget this. We'll just get on line and stay there." 1
Additional concerns were raised by senior enlisted that
moving in the rehearsed L- shape formation required too much
time to form a defensive line if a threat developed.
Another problem surfaced regarding the medical evacuation
Naval Special Warfare Command Lessons Learned, Operation JUST CAUSE, p. 4- 1 8.
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(MEDEVAC) procedures. Despite using correct radio
procedures, SEAL medics had difficulty getting their request
for a MEDEVAC through the JSOTF command post . After
significant delay, one finally arrived. These issues were
brought up to the Ground Force Commander (GFC) , Commander
McGraff, but he felt comfortable with the rehearsal and
apparently dismissed these concerns.
In the after action review held on Friday 15 December,
the field commanders briefed optimistically about the
results of the rehearsals. In regard to the rehearsals,
General Lindsay commented, "The rehearsal went well. It
went astonishingly well. In fact, Sunday morning on
December 17 I talked with General Powell, he asked me could
we do it? I said, absolutely. We did it the other night.
The only thing that bothers me is that there ought to be a
few problems. We didn't have any problems. Since there is
always a bit of luck involved, I hope we haven't used up all
our good luck." Perhaps the Navy side of the house should
have felt the same.
On the afternoon of 17 December President Bush ordered
the invasion. As NSWG-2 forces prepared to deploy, changes
13
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were made to the plan. Because of concerns over the
leadership abilities of Commander McGrath, and
communications concerns, Captain Sandoz made several drastic
changes to the task organization of TU-PAPA. He decided to
separate the force into two elements. The assault force,
renamed the ground force, would include three SEAL platoons,
a two man CCT, and a six man command and mortar element
including the ground force commander - a total of 62 men.
The other element was to be the support force . Remaining
off shore during the assault the support force consisted of
three R&S teams, two patrol boats with crews and detachments
of SIGINT and PSYOP- a total of 26 personnel. He also
decided that the commander of the entire Paitilla operation
should remain with the patrol boats to facilitate
communications back to the Task Unit. This job was assigned
to McGrath. An additional command position was established
subordinate to McGrath to command the ground operations.
Sandoz assigned ST-4's Executive Officer (XO) to this
position. Although the XO had not rehearsed any of the
ground operations, Sandoz felt he was familiar enough with
the operation to be the ground force leader.
80
An additional change was made by McGrath. As the task
unit readied to depart, one SEAL officer who had been
temporarily assigned as a patient at Walter Reed Army
Hospital, requested that he be allowed on the mission. He
was the assistant platoon commander of one of the assigned
platoons. After being told by his XO that only the CO could
make that decision, he went to McGrath. McGrath approved.
This officer was later killed in action on Paitilla
Airfield.
3 . Preparatory Phase Analysis
Already many elements of Vandenbroucke' s and McRaven's
theories have been identified in the planning stages of this
mission. Before examining the execution phase of this
mission, it might be insightful to see if the outcome of the
mission can be predicted in terms of how well these elements
have been addressed.
In terms of Vandenbroucke, many of his ideas have
surfaced. Vandenbroucke cites faulty intelligence,
especially HUMINT, as a source of failure in U.S. special
operations. Mission planning, in this case, had identified
HUMINT as a variable of significant concern. Specifically,
the lack of HUMINT was evident since this information
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effectively stopped as a result of personnel movements being
restricted in Panama. In fact, intelligence shortfalls such
as numbers of enemy personnel, were repeatedly expressed as
being a hindrance in all the SOF target assessments,
including Paitilla Airfield.
Already poor coordination, Vandenbroucke' s second
element, has been demonstrated. During several rehearsals,
the SEALs themselves had problems coordinating the
movements of the two platoons involved. This being even
more of a concern since three platoons were to be used on
the actual mission. Additionally, they had problems
coordinating the MEDEVAC procedures at the Navarre
rehearsal . Also as a result of concerns over leadership and
communications, both critical elements of coordinating
forces, the entire task organization was restructured, but
not rehearsed, just prior to deployment.
Vandenbroucke ' s next two common problems are inadequate
information and advice provided to decision makers and
wishful thinking on the part of decision makers. There are
numerous times when these two problems are demonstrated.
When General Lindsay boasts to General Powell that all the
rehearsals went off with no problems, somehow the problems
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the SEALs had were overlooked. In fact, how could either
McGrath or Sandoz advise General Lindsay they were ready
when they had not even conducted a proper rehearsal with an
accurate depiction of Paitilla Airfield and the actual
forces that were to be utilized? Obviously, at least
McGrath and Sandoz fell victim to Vandenbroucke ' s problem of
wishful thinking on the part of decision makers. Apparently
concerns raised about this not being a SEAL mission, or that
during the rehearsed movements the SEALs were too exposed
and vulnerable, or that command and control was still a
problem, were simply wished away by senior SEAL leaders
involved in this mission.
In fact, the only problem that Vandenbroucke identifies
that has not been demonstrated already, is his idea of
micromanagement by leaders outside the theater during
execution. This, perhaps because the execution phase has
not yet been examined. Vandenbroucke would probably say
that this mission has already failed even before it begins.
Now in terms of McRaven. McRaven's first principle is
simplicity. When the force structure was changed from only
two platoons totaling about twenty four personnel, to three
platoons and over sixty personnel the complexity of the plan
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increased dramatically. The change in command and control
positions also increased the complexity of the operation.
Although these changes might be justified, they nonetheless
change a simple plan to a very complex plan with inherent
command and control problems
.
McRaven's principles of security and surprise have been
mentioned already as well. H-Hour was originally chosen as
0100 to facilitate surprise, but only if the mission could
be kept a secret. Examining the execution phase will reveal
if this consideration was enough. Although TU-PAPA's plan
of patroling some forty plus men wearing 100-120 pound packs
down an open runway seems unlikely to achieve the benefits
from the element of surprise.
McRaven's element of repetition seems to be understood
to some extent by these planners . When General Lindsay
ordered all SOF personnel to conduct full dress rehearsals,
he clearly demonstrated an understanding of the utility of
repetition. A pity that the senior SEAL planners did not
have this same understanding. As McRaven points out, it is
essential that the actual participants of a mission do the
rehearsals. If the senior SEAL planners, specifically
McGrath and Sandoz, properly understood this, then the
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Navarre rehearsals would have had all three planned
platoons, not just two, and all 62 participants, not just
42, take part. Additionally, Captain Sandoz and Commander
McGrath, having made such a drastic change to the task
organization at the last minute, including putting people in
key positions of leadership despite their having never been
rehearsed, greatly diminished the expected effectiveness of
the rehearsals conducted.
McRaven's last two elements of his theory, speed and
purpose were arguably overlooked as well. McRaven
specifically recognizes that special operations forces are
not manned or equipped to conduct long duration engagements.
McRaven states that the will of the enemy to resist is a
given and that over time the frictions of war work only
against special operations forces. This mission was
expected to last at least four hours, and General Lindsay
warned Captain Sandoz that he should plan for even longer.
In McRaven's case studies the longest mission was at Saint-
Nazaire and was planned to last two hours while the average
time of all the missions was only thirty minutes. Clearly
14
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this mission blatantly violates McRaven's principle of
speed.
Finally, McRaven points out that a clear purpose was
essential for success. Already the ROE has changed from one
that required minimal damage to property which meant that
the SEALs could only slash tires, to permissive force that
allowed the SEALs to use their stand off weapons. Aside
from the problems expressed by the SEAL platoon commander in
regards to whether or not the enemy could be engaged,
Sandoz, the TF-WHITE commander, also expressed confusion
about the ROE. He said the ROE were, "a constant variable
equation - with the variables being the necessary level of
destruction to accomplish the task, safety to U.S. forces
and the psychological impact we wanted to have on Noriega
and his regime." Obviously the exact purpose of this
mission was already beginning to confuse both planners and
participants alike.
Of the five problems that Vandenbroucke identifies, all
but one have been violated. Only his idea of
micromanagement of the execution phase by leaders outside
the theater of operations has not yet been demonstrated. Of
Naval Special Warfare Command Lessons Learned, Operation JUST CAUSE, p. 4-9.
86
the six elements for a successful special operation that
McRaven identifies, five are neglected in this mission plan.
Simplicity, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose are all
in question. Security will be examined in the execution
phase. If these two theories are indeed correct, then this
mission already seems to have little chance to succeed. Now
let us look at the execution phase.
4 . Execution Phase
During the evening of 18 December 1989, TU-PAPA left
Norfolk via USAF aircraft and arrived five hours later in
Panama. By 170 on 19 December, the ground force, its
equipment and CRRCs were loaded into trucks at NSWU-8, at
NAVSTA Rodman, in Panama, and trucked to Kobbe beach three
miles south of NSWU-8 on Fort Kobbe. Planners had decided
not to launch the CRRCs from NAVSTA Rodman to avoid their
being seen by the enemy. Instead the plan was altered so
that the CRRCs would be trucked to Kobbe and launched from
there. After launching, the SEALs would transit via CRRCs
and rendezvous with awaiting patrol boats two nautical miles
out (see Figure 3)
.
Meanwhile at NAVSTA Rodman, the support force loaded
onto two SBU-26 patrol boats, one MK III patrol boat and one
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patrol boat light (PBL) . By 18 all support personnel and
equipment had been loaded and they departed NAVSTA Rodman
and headed for the rendezvous with the ground force.
At 1800 the two forces successfully linked up at sea.
The SEAL armada passed Flamenco Island and by 2130 arrived
at a point just off Paitilla Airfield's seaward side.
Despite some problems with the PBL, everything was going as
planned. At 2145, TU-PAPA reported to TF WHITE that all
boats and R&S teams were in position. The diagram on the
following page is a copy of an original ST-4 briefing slide
and shows the routes taken by the various elements of TU-
PAPA.
Shortly after arriving at the loitering point east of
the airfield. TU-PAPA received word that the ROE had been
changed yet again. The Joint Special Operations Task Force
(JSOTF) had relayed the changes from JTF SOUTH that the
ground forces were not to destroy aircraft and collateral
damage must be kept to an absolute minimum. This change
forced TU-PAPA to reconsider the actions at the objective.
After discussing this change with the GFC, it was decided




Figure 3. TU-PAPA Boat Routes. From Naval Special Warfare Command
Lessons Learned, Operation JUST CAUSE, p. 6-8.
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outside the hangar, while being careful to limit small arms
fire to only what was necessary.
One hour before H-Hour, a two man swimmer scout team
crawled from the water and began scouting the immediate
area. Their purpose was to ensure that there were no enemy
on the beach or in the area and then signal for the rest of
the ground force to come ashore. After a thorough
reconnaissance, the scout team determined that the area was
safe and they signaled for the rest of the ground force to
come ashore
.
While TU-PAPA was waiting off Paitilla, LTG Stiner,
commander of JTF-SOUTH, believed that surprise had been
lost. He based this judgment on U.S. intelligence that
indicated that the PDF forces were going to alert status and
organizing their defense. McRaven's last principle of
security had been breached. This would compromise H-Hour
and consequently seriously call to question the element of
surprise necessary for success. Intelligence indicated that
one enemy calvary platoon, heavily armed, was dispatched to
Paitilla. By 2200, nothing happened and the calvary platoon
returned to their base at Panama Vie jo. Stiner brought his
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concern to USCINCSO and it was decided to move H-Hour
forward to 0045, 20 December.
At 0015, TU-PAPA was informed by TF WHITE that H-Hour
had been changed. The GFC then boarded his CRRC and motored
to each SEAL element in the line of CRRCs and briefed them
on the changes to the ROE and the change to H-Hour.
The ground force then proceeded into the beach with the
guidance of the R&S team's signal. Bravo platoon landed
first and formed a defensive perimeter. Then Golf platoon,
Delta platoon, and last the C3 mortar element and the CCT.
As the SEALs landed shooting and explosions could be heard
as the other SOF forces began their assault on Panama. This
put every PDF soldier in Panama on alert . Surprise was
definitely lost. Compounding this problem was a report that
the GFC received informing him that Noriega was inbound in a
small aircraft. If the report were true, Noriega would land
right in the middle of the SEALs' advance. In response the
GFC yelled, "Let's go, go, go!" The SEALs reacted by
splashing through the water and loudly stumbling up the
beach to assemble into their platoons.
The GFC knew that the SEALs had to move quickly if they
were to stop Noriega from reaching his plane and affecting
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his escape. As the SEALs assembled at the south end of the
runway, the GFC told the Assistant Platoon Commander (APL)
of Bravo platoon to move his platoon up the runway as fast
as possible and disable Noriega's jet. After word was
passed among the platoons, Golf and Bravo platoon proceeded
in file formation up the west side of the runway. Their
speed was hampered by the weight of the 12 pound packs of
equipment and ammunition that each SEAL carried. Once
again, as in the rehearsals, the formation became strung out
and command and control of the movement was difficult.
As Bravo and Golf made their way to Noriega's hangar,
Delta platoon and the C3 mortar element headed up the east
side of the runway to a position about 500 yards north. The
GFC and the mortar element set up in a position about 500
yards south east of the hangars to provide fire support and
command and control . Delta platoon was ordered up the
runway to set up an ambush for any aircraft that might try
to use the runway. Both elements were in position by 0105.
The figure on the next page is a copy of an original ST-4
briefing slide and shows the positions of the forces at this








Figure 4. Paitilla Airfield Initial Positions. From Naval Special
Warfare Command Lessons Learned, Operation JUST CAUSE, p. 6-13.
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Meanwhile Golf and Bravo platoons were making their
advance toward the hangars when they moved through an open
field and encountered ten lightly armed civilian guards.
Apparently they were guarding the many parked aircraft
reportedly owned by suspected drug smugglers . The guards
yelled at the SEALs to get off the runway. The SEALs, not
wanting to harm civilians, told them to leave the area
immediately. The guards seeing the comparably heavily armed
SEALs wisely chose to leave. At this point, Golf platoon
formed into an inverted L- shape formation, the same
formation questioned by many during rehearsals, and began
their final approach to the hangars.
At 0055 the R&S team stationed off Panama Viejo
reported sighting three armored cars moving toward Paitilla.
Upon receiving this information, the GFC thought that
Noriega's arrival must be imminent, and that these forces
were going to the airfield to provide security for his
arrival . This in turn prompted the GFC to radio the
advancing Golf platoon and tell them to hasten the advance
of the two SEAL platoons. In response, the SEALs moved much
faster then what was rehearsed or tactically prudent. Both
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platoons now in inverted L- formations were quickly moving
over open ground toward the hangars
.
At 0101 the GFC ordered Delta platoon to run up the
runway to provide support to the other two platoons . The
CCT were also trying to raise the AC-130H to coordinate fire
support for the impending fire fight that was certain to
occur. The CCT was never able to contact the AC- 13 OH
despite all attempts. The AC-130H was considered critical
to the success of the mission, especially in light of the
three armored cars heading toward Paitilla. The TF-WHITE
Commander recalled this affected the operation in two ways,
"First, had we had the AC- 13 in position and communicating
with it, it is possible that using his sensors, he could
have relayed information about the activity at the
objective-PDF hangar and thereabouts -to us. Which would
have allowed us to have a better idea of what we were going
in to. Second, once the initial firefight started, had we
had the AC-130, the tactic would have been to pull back and
let the AC-13 do a more extensive preparatory fire on that
objective. We did not have that option." 16 It was later
confirmed that the AC-130, in order to comply with last
Naval Special Warfare Command Lessons Learned, Operation JUST CAUSE, p. 6-15.
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minute changes to the communications plan for Operation JUST
CAUSE, had changed frequencies. No one bothered to tell the
CCT of the change
.
The SEALs arrived in front of the hangars at 0105. Not
only were they in the open, but ambient light form
surrounding buildings clearly exposed the SEALs. Bravo
platoon formed in a line just south of the hangars. Golf
continued north. The SEALs could see PDF guards armed with
AK-47s moving inside the two northernmost hangars. As Bravo
drew closer the PDF yelled "Halt, Stop or we will shoot!"
The SEALs yelled back in Spanish for the guards to leave the
area or die. This might actually have worked if
intelligence reports were true about the PDF being
unmotivated and not wanting an encounter with U.S. forces.
Unfortunately the intelligence reports were wrong.
As Bravo platoon, first squad, was advancing in front
of the hangars, over open ground and illuminated by ambient
light, just eight to twelve feet separated each man. Just
before reaching the north edge of the tarmac, the fourth man
in the formation, an M-60 gunner, saw a PDF soldier assume a
firing position behind barrels in front of the Aero Perlas
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hangar. The M-6 gunner initiated fire, believing the guard
was about to engage.
PDF guards returned fire form the two northernmost
hangars. Caught with no cover, the SEALs dove for the
ground. The SEALs tried to fire on the defensively-
positioned and well covered PDF forces. The SEALs did not
stand a chance. Eight of the nine SEALs in the first squad
were hit and wounded. Many of the SEALs remained where they
fell, unable to move. Only the platoon commander was not
hit.
Meanwhile the second squad, only 2 yards to the south,
thought that first squad was simply firing into the hangar
to disable the aircraft. At first they did not think
anything was wrong until the Golf OIC radioed second squad
and yelled, "We are in contact! I have casualties! I have
a lot of casualties!" The squad's three M-60 machine guns
and remaining CAR- 15s began firing back and forced the PDF
to stop firing and seek cover. The figure on the next page
is a copy of an original ST-4 briefing slide and shows the
position of the SEALs when the firefight began.
As the PDF fire lessened, the APL in second squad
ordered his medical team to move to first squad to
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Figure 5. Positions during firefight. From Naval Special Warfare
Command Lessons Learned, Operation JUST CAUSE, p. 6-20.
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administer first aid. First squad's corpsman had been
seriously wounded and was unable to render assistance. When
the platoon chief, ENC McFaul, tried to move first squad's
corpsman to safety, he was shot in the head and neck and
died instantly.
By now the PDF had started firing again. The APL of
Bravo platoon now moved his squad forward to provide
support. During this maneuver two SEALs form Bravo platoon
were hit, LTJG Connors (abdomen wound) and QM3 Anthony Duchi
(leg wound)
.
The GFC now ordered Delta platoon to move across the
tarmac to reinforce the battle. Originally the combined
strength of Golf and Bravo platoons had been 3 3 men. This
was severely diminished with one SEAL dead and ten wounded.
While Delta was advancing the PDF increased their fire on
the SEALs. The firefight intensified and the SEALS launched
40mm grenades into the hangars. While trying to get into a
better firing position, the APL of Bravo platoon, LTJG
Connor, already wounded, was mortally hit. PR3 Richard
Asherman was also wounded. Despite this desperate
situation, the remaining SEALs increased their effective
fire and began to have an effect on the PDF. The second
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firefight lasted five minutes and was winding down when
Delta arrived.
During this second firefight, the GFC and four men from
the mortar element, two corpsman and two SEALs, ran to the
battle. As the SEALs consolidated their perimeter and began
administering first aid to the wounded, the PDF started
firing again. The GFC ordered, "Use HE (high explosives) . .
.
Blow the shit out of that place!" All concerns for "minimal
damage" had obviously been wisely abandoned. An AT-4 rocket
was launched against Noriega's airplane. It entered the
cabin just behind the cockpit, the explosion of the rocket
rendering it a complete loss (see Figure 6 for photo of
Noriega's plane). The SEALs then began to resume laying
down massive amounts of fire power into the hangars.
PDF resistance ended at 0117, after only ten minutes
from the initial assault. The GFC ordered a cease fire and
began to assess the casualties. There was one confirmed
dead from Bravo platoon, LTJG Connors, the officer who had
pleaded to be added at the last minute, and one wounded.
ENC McFaul and BM1 Tilghman from Golf platoon were dead and
three other SEALs critically wounded. Five other SEALs from
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Golf platoon were wounded, some still laying where they had
fallen when hit.
A perimeter was reformed and a landing zone for the
MEDEVAC helicopter was established. Three more SEALs
discovered that they too had received wounds. In the
adrenaline of the battle they did not realize they had
received these wounds. GMG2 Burtch had taken a round
through his right biceps. RM2 Plank suffered a wound to
his left shoulder. QM2 Torganson took a round through his
leg, but luckily it did not hit bone. At 0146, the GFC
reported to TU-PAPA that Paitilla airfield was secure.
The reported PDF armored cars did not arrive.
Apparently they had been instructed to go to Panama city
and not Paitilla Airfield.
Figure 6. Manuel Noriega's shot-up jet. From United States Special Operations Command,
"10th Anniversary History," 1997, p.26.
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Inside the hangars five fortified PDF fighting
positions were found. In the Aero Perlas hangar two
positions were found. Inside the PDF hangar three fighting
positions were found. Several large blood pools indicated
that some PDF were hit. Although it will never be known for
sure, most SEALs estimate that the opposition numbered about
ten soldiers.
There were delays in finding a MEDEVAC helicopter
because all were deployed in support of other missions.
After a few minutes a UH-60 MEDEVAC helicopter was finally
available. Extremely high air traffic delayed the control
tower from granting the UH-60 clearance to take off. The
MEDEVAC crew took off on their own initiative, being careful
to look for other aircraft . Unfortunately they did not have
the correct coordinates. Communications problems kept them
from being able to talk to the SEALs on the ground.
Interestingly enough, the SEALs had problems with
communications with the MEDEVAC helicopter during the
Navarre rehearsals as well. Luckily the helicopter crew
spotted the strobe signal designating the SEALs' landing
zone. They landed at 0205. A flight that should have taken
ten minutes ended up taking 35 minutes. The wounded SEALs
102
were loaded on board and evacuated. TM2 Rodriguez, one of
the wounded, later died at Wilford Hall in Panama.
The SEALs now returned to their perimeter positions to
await the reinforcement force that they expected to arrive
within the planned four to five hours. Throughout the rest
of the day the SEALs waited. They busied themselves with
patrolling the perimeter and carrying some of their
equipment down to the beach for transfer to the waiting
patrol boats. Night approached and still no relief force.
At 2000 TU-PAPA passed word to the GFC that unexpected
delays meant that the relief force would not arrive until
the next day. Sporadic small arms fire occurred throughout
the night possibly from looters or drug smugglers, but
fortunately none of the SEALs were hit . Various reports of
impending PDF attack kept the SEALs on alert around their
perimeter. Finally at about 1400 the next day, five CH-47
helicopters landed at the airfield. A Ranger company
disembarked to relieve the SEALs. The SEALs had lasted 37
hours instead of the anticipated five hours.
5. Execution Phase Analysis
Every one of McRaven's principles necessary for the
successful conduct of special operations was violated on
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this mission. Most of the principles were violated even
before the mission began. The only principle that required
examining during the execution phase was security. This
principle was lost when H-Hour had to be moved because LTG
Stiner had information indicating that the PDF had been
alerted.
All but one of Vandenbroucke ' s problems were evident in
this mission as well. Some of these problems such as
coordination with the MEDEVAC had even been identified in
rehearsals but not corrected. As for Vandenbroucke ' s
problem of micromanagement from outside the theater, this
mission being only one of many occurring at the same time,
it was unlikely that that would happen. One might argue,
however, that the last minute ROE change, in response to the
State Department's concern over excessive battle damage, was
in fact micromanagement of the sort described by
Vandenbroucke
.
Some reports say this mission was a success because the
SEALs had in fact accomplished their mission of disabling
Noriega's aircraft and securing the airfield. This success,
however, was at the expense of four lives. Any mission that
loses even one man, not to mention four, is a failure. The
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real tragedy is that this was never a SEAL mission. SEALs
are not a holding force. As McRaven would point out,
special operations forces rely on speed and are not trained
or equipped for long duration operations. Captain Sandoz
and Commander McGrath should have known better. Both being
SEALs, they should have known this was not a SEAL mission to
begin with. Sixty plus men on open ground, while
illuminated, running directly in to an enemy who is
concealed and protected. That is not a good plan. Those
men who went on this mission fought bravely. Those who lost
their lives made the ultimate sacrifice for their country.
A sacrifice that can never be repaid. Those men relied on
their senior leaders to make experienced sound decisions.
Four men lost their lives and eight more were seriously
wounded because of their senior leaders making unforgivably
stupid decisions. One source reports that Captain Sandoz
was moved to a job in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
where he can not hurt anyone. Let us hope so, he and his
cohort McGrath have done enough harm already.
Walker, G., At the Hurricane 's Eye, p. 1 60, Ballantine Books, 1 994.
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D. IRAQ: OPERATION DESERT STORM18
1 . Background
Iraq is a country that has endured a long history of
many violent military rulers. No exception to this history
is rule under present leader, Saddam Hussein. In 1979,
Saddam Hussein was elected president. Hussein accused Baath
Party leaders of plotting against his government. He
conducted a high level purge that led to the execution of
five members of the Revolutionary Command Council and dozens
of other military officers. This was the beginning of
Saddam Hussein's reign of dictatorial leadership.
The Israelis became concerned over Iraq's pursuit of a
nuclear weapons capability. In 1981, Israeli jets bombed
the Osarik nuclear reactor before it could be completed in a
preemptive strike designed to set back Iraq's nuclear
weapons program.
In late 1987, Iraq began a resettlement program to
remove Kurds from their ancestral homelands. The Kurds
resisted. In 1988, Saddam Hussein demonstrated to the Kurds
that resistance was costly. At least 4,000 people died in
IS
Unless otherwise noted, information pertaining to this mission was drawn primarily from Naval Special
Warfare Command Lessons Learned from operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
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Halbja after the government used poison gas and other
weapons to suppress resistance.
On March 2, 1989 Amnesty International reported
Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, Ethiopia, Burma and Iraq as
users of death squad tactics. These tactics were
responsible for official murder of unarrested suspects or
dissidents by police or military teams or individuals. Iraq
had the distinction of being the most flagrant violator.
On March 28, 1990 five people were arrested in Britain
on charges of trying to smuggle nuclear triggering devices
to Iraq. Forty of the devices were captured at Heathrow
Airport. The devices had secretly been purchased in the
United States, which began its own crackdown on Iraqi
operations
.
Saddam Hussein began verbally threatening his Arab
neighbors. On July 17, 1990, Saddam Hussein condemned
nations in the Persian Gulf that exceeded oil quotas. His
country's own economic problems grew. Estimates are that
they were facing a 40 percent inflation rate and a military
budget of about $700 a year for every citizen in a country
where the average annual income was only $1950. Hussein
accused Kuwait of trying to cheat on oil production quotas.
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He further accused several countries of conspiring with the
United States to drive down the price of oil.
On July 18, 1990, Iraq's foreign minister claimed that
there were Kuwaiti military posts on Iraqi territory and
that Kuwait had stolen $2.4 billion in Iraqi oil. Following
the speech, Kuwaiti armed forces were placed on alert. On
July 23, Kuwait's foreign minister was labeled a U.S. agent
by the Iraqi media. Kuwait sought to defuse the growing
tensions by putting their forces on a 25 percent alert
status. Iraq responded on July 24 by deploying thousands of
troops along the border with Kuwait . Two days later Iraq
demanded that Kuwait pay the $2.4 billion that they said was
owed them.
Kuwait rejected Iraq's demands. Kuwait sought to
appease Iraq by offering concessions such as loans and
sharing of revenue derived from the Rumaylah oil field. It
was learned later, through captured senior military leaders,
that Iraq had already decided to invade Kuwait as early as
July 17, 1990.
On August 1, 1990, talks between Iraq and Kuwait broke




President Bush immediately condemned Iraq, stating that
the invasion of Kuwait and potential Iraqi domination of
Saudi Arabia through intimidation or invasion presented a
real threat to U.S. national interests, requiring a decisive
response. The United States immediately froze all Iraqi and
Kuwaiti financial assets in the United States, and banned
most trade. He also sent a carrier battle group to the
Persian Gulf.
At the United nations, the Security council voted 14-0
to condemn Iraq and demand the immediate withdrawal of
troops from Kuwait
.
Iraqi troops began to mass along the Saudi Arabian
border from what only days earlier had been the independent
nation of Kuwait. The troops along the border appeared to
be preparing for action.
On 4 August, President Bush was briefed by Commander in
Chief Central (CINCCENT) and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on possible options. One option was
to conduct air strikes against targets in Iraq. A second
option was to implement Operations Plan 1002-90 (OPLAN 1002-
90), Defense of the Arabian Peninsula. The President
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decided that if Saudi Arabia invited the United States to
take action, he would choose OPLAN 1002-90.
On 6 August, the Secretary of Defense and his military
commanders visited King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. The group
expressed President Bush's pledge of support, and asked for
permission to base U.S. troops, ships, and aircraft on Saudi
territory. With Iraqi troops poised at his border, King
Fahd invited the United States to send forces. The
President immediately ordered DOD to begin deployments.
2 . Preparatory Phase
The objectives as outlined by the President were:
1. Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal
of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
2. Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.
3
.
Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the
Persian Gulf.
4. Safety and protection of American citizens abroad.
As it became apparent that deterrence was not working,
military action against Iraq was ordered.
United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM) OPORD 003-
90, developed between August and November, stated the
following SOF mission: USCENTCOM Special Operations Forces
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will conduct special operations in Kuwait, Iraq, and
Northern Saudi Arabia in support of all phases of the United
States Commander in Chief Central Command (USCINCCENT)
,
General Schwarzkopf's, campaign plan. This mission
statement was applicable throughout Desert Shield/Storm.
From this mission statement, Special Operations Command
Central (SOCCENT) derived the following tasks:
1. Position SOF teams and liaison officers with
forward deployed coalition units and conduct Foreign
Internal Defense (FID) training as required.
2. Conduct Special Reconnaissance of Iraqi forces.
3
.
Be prepared to conduct Combat Search and Rescue
(CSAR) in Iraq and Kuwait.
General Schwarzkopf had definite ideas about the use of
SOF. He felt SOF would not win the war, but could make a
difference in the overall effort. He also thought that
there was no mission worth taking undue risk for, and said
to the Naval Special Warfare Commander, "Watch how you run
the operation; if the seas are bad, don't risk your guys."
Naval Special Warfare Command Lessons Learned, Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, p. 4-1.
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Sharing Schwarzkopf's philosophy, the Commander Naval
Special Warfare Task Group Central (CNSWTG-C) , Captain Ray
Smith, developed six criteria for NSW missions:
1. Any NSW mission had to make an impact on the CINC's
objectives and fit into the CINC's warfighting strategy.
2. Each NSW mission had to have a high probability of
success
.
3. SEALs were not to be exposed to unnecessary risk.
4. NSW missions had to be primarily maritime in
nature
.
5. The SEALs approach or extraction had to be by sea.
6. Coalition warfare.
With the CNSWTG-C s objectives strictly adhered to,
many missions were conducted by NSW forces. One such
mission was the deception operation at Mina Saud. The
operation was intended to deceive Iraq into thinking an
amphibious assault was imminent. The idea for the mission
evolved in a briefing by the CNSWTG-C to the Commander
Marines Central (COMMARCENT) about NSW forces and
capabilities. COMMARCENT wanted to divert the enemy's
attention and forces from an anticipated USMC assault. The
operation was well suited to traditional NSW skills.
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CNSWTG-C had no problem obtaining CINCENT approval to carry
out the mission.
The mission was given to Foxtrot Platoon, commanded by
Lieutenant Tom Dietz from SEAL Team FIVE. Prior to the
tasking, his platoon had conducted four swimmer
reconnaissance operations along the Kuwaiti coast. These
operations were initiated about two weeks after the air
strikes had began. The purpose of these operations was
intelligence collection. The intention was to confirm what
was already known about the area or to identify any
differences in the information held. They were also to
identify any beaches suitable for an amphibious landing.
Two beaches were identified as possible areas for
amphibious operations. After further reconnaissance where
swimmers actually went ashore, the beach just above Mina
Saud was chosen. The figure on the next page shows where
these operations took place.
Some three weeks into the air war Deitz was told that
there probably wouldn't be an amphibious invasion, but to
work up a deception plan. The mission was directed to begin




Figure 7. Map of operational area. From Naval Special Warfare Command
Lessons Learned, Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Fig. 12-1.
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actual time for the ground offensive was not disclosed to
Deitz until the night of the deception operation.
When tasking was received, the entire platoon gathered
to decide how to do it . A concept of operations was planned
for tactical transport of SEALs and four Combat Rubber
Raiding Craft (CRRC) by two High Speed Boats (HSBs) from Ras
Al Mishab to an area about 10 miles out to sea from Mina
Saud at 2000 hours on the night before the ground assault
was to occur. They would launch their CRRCs and transit to
an area 500 meters from the beach. Here, six SEALs would
swim in with haversacks containing 20 pounds of C-4
explosives, connect them in series with detonation cord, and
emplace them at the beach near the water line. The charges
were to be initiated by time clocks. The charges were to be
laid out to cover about 200-250 yards of beach. Also,
orange marker buoys were to be placed in the water to give
the appearance of lane markers for amphibious craft. After
the charges and buoys were in place, the SEALs were to
return to the CRRCs for rendezvous with the HSBs.
Just before the clocks initiated the charges,
additional HSBs would fire on the beach and drop smaller C-4
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charges over the side. All of this was intended to create
the impression that major activity was about to occur.
The concept was approved up the chain but SOCCENT did
not want the men on the beach. The plan was further
modified to eliminate the series charge in favor of six
separate charges
.
The forces for the mission included Foxtrot Platoon,
three CRRCs, and four HSBs. The platoon had photo
intelligence dated in November and having only recently
conducted reconnaissance of the beach, they had good HUMINT
on the forces and layout of the area. In addition, the
platoon had almost real time intelligence through the USMC
Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) detachment operating in the
area. The USMC RPV operator ran the RPV along the coast
where the operation was to take place. This allowed the
platoon to observe on TV exactly what was there.
OPSEC for the mission was based on procedures that were
part of the standard operating procedures at Ras Al Mishab,
which was a Saudi base. These were:
1. Briefing rooms were located away from the Saudis.
2. The HSBs were berthed out of sight. Therefore,
since the loud HSB engines could not be masked, the engines
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were routinely run every night; whether there was an actual
mission or not
.
3. Team personnel did not "cammie-up" for a mission
until they were at sea.
4. Weapons were only test fired at sea.
5. The HSB transit routes north were varied.
The mission required the full sweep of communications
equipment: UHF, HF, and SATCOM . Each mode of communication
had multiple back up radios. Before the mission,
communications checks were conducted with helicopter, fixed
wing and surface ships that would be operating in the area
for possible support. Communications were also established
with the CENTCOM Airborne Battlefield Command and Control
Center to assure good communications in the event the
platoon needed close air support (CAS)
.
A rehearsal was conducted involving the CRRCs and
placement of the haversacks. The previous reconnaissance
operations conducted in the objective area made rehearsal
with the HSBs unnecessary. The swimmers needed only dry
suits, fins and the explosives to do the mission. But they
planned on carrying twenty- five pounds worth of extra gear
in case things went wrong. Three would carry suppressed
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Heckler and Koch MP-5 machine guns to use if sentries
patrolled the beach. Three others would carry CAR- 15s with
203s attached for firing 40mm grenades into machine gun
nests if necessary. Each had a pistol in case his primary
weapon jammed, and a knife strapped to his leg in case he
became entangled in underwater barbed wire. If things got
really bad, they had 50 cal . machine guns, M-60 machine
guns, and grenade launchers on the boats, and the ability to
call for CAS.
In addition, the swimmers would carry small scuba
bottles. The plan was that if enemy soldiers fired at them,
the swimmers could use the scuba bottles to escape
underwater. The bottles gave them three minutes of air,
enough to swim far enough out to sea to be virtually
undetectable by anyone on land. Each would have a red lens
flashlight to signal if he became separated from the rest of
the group, plus a backup strobe light and chemical light.
Underneath their dry suits they would wear camouflaged
fatigues in case they had to escape over land. In small
waterproof backpacks they would carry dry jungle boots.
They also would have an extra CRRC and two spare outboard
motors in case of equipment failure.
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3 . Preparatory Phase Analysis
The preparatory phase of this mission seems to be well
thought out and the mission plan appears to be thorough.
Comparing this phase to Vandenbroucke ' s theory one can see
that many, if not all, of his ideas are accounted for. The
intelligence for this mission was exceptional. Not only did
the assigned platoon have recent "eyes on," they also made
excellent use of the Marine's RPV to gain real time
intelligence. Fortunately for the platoon, the war
environment allowed them to use the RPV to actually view the
target area by television to get the latest intelligence
possible. Also fortunate for the platoon, they were able to
conduct their reconnaissance prior to this mission
undetected, despite many close calls with the enemy. During
these efforts they gathered detailed information on enemy
patrols in the area, habits of the enemy and their exact
location. This information would prove invaluable in
conducting the mission.
Coordination with other forces was also considered and
demonstrated in this phase. The use of the Marine RPV
demonstrated that coordination was already successfully
conducted in preparing for the mission. In addition, the
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SEALs had specific plans to conduct CAS. They conducted
communications checks and briefings with this support prior
to the mission so that they could coordinate support if
needed. The SEALs also established communications with
additional forces in the area that were not a part of the
main support plan, but could be called upon to assist if
necessary.
Inadequate advice to decision makers does not seem to
be evident so far either. In fact, the mission was
conceived while the NSW Commander, Captain Smith, was
briefing the Marine Commander on the capabilities of the
SEALs. In addition, General Schwarzkopf was very familiar
with SEAL operations because he had been involved in the
Panama invasion years earlier. Schwarzkopf had witnessed
both the capabilities and the limitations of special
operations forces during Grenada and Panama. Schwarzkopf
had made it clear that he would give the final approval on
all special operations mission proposals. With General
Schwarzkopf and Captain Smith working together, it seems
unlikely that any decision makers were given faulty advice
in regards to this mission.
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General Schwarzkopf's advice to Smith to not risk his
men presents a clear indication that this mission was not a
victim of Vandenbroucke ' s wishful thinking. Indeed, the
fact that Captain Smith established very clear criteria for
assigning any mission to the SEALs, it demonstrated that
these senior planners would not fall victim to wishful
thinking. In addition, the plan conceived by the platoon
shows that they too were not victims of wishful thinking.
Even though they expected to be in and out , their plan was
designed to cover any contingencies that they might
encounter. They planned for communications backup. They
conducted thorough radio checks with supporting forces and
potential supporting forces. They had a wide assortment of
fire power at their disposal from suppressed weapons to
close air support. They had contingency plans for escape
and evasion out to sea using the scuba bottles, and over
land with dry clothes and boots. They had various link up
plans with numerous redundancies in signaling devices. They
planned to carry an extra boat and motor. They had two
clocks for each demolition charge. In short, they appear to
have planned for any contingency, even though if they
conduct the mission properly, they should not even be seen
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by the enemy. If anything, this mission seems to be planned
with the exact opposite of wishful thinking in mind.
Each of the elements that Vandenbroucke cites as
contributing to failure seem to be planned for in this
mission. Vandenbroucke ' s last element of micro management
during execution remains to be seen. In terms of
Vandenbroucke ' s theory, however, this mission appears to
have had an excellent chance for success. Of course the
frictions of war can never be fully predicted, but the SEALs
and senior leaders who planned and approved this mission
seem to have done everything in their power to try to
anticipate and control these frictions. Now let us see how
this phase holds up under McRaven's theory.
McRaven's first element of simplicity is demonstrated
in this phase. The mission is a classic SEAL mission with
few complicated elements. The mission is very similar to
the reconnaissance missions that had already been
successfully conducted. The only difference is that they
were now going to make some noise a safe distance from
shore. Swim in, set charges, make noise, leave. Simple.
McRaven's concerns for OPSEC are also clearly
demonstrated. Note the elaborate rules designed to ensure
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mission security, such as running the boat engines, not
putting on "cammie" paint until out to sea, and locating all
briefing rooms in secure areas. Also, only enough
information to plan the mission was provided to the platoon.
They were not even told exactly when the ground war was to
start until the last minute, even though this had no effect
on their planning. This last bit of information only told
them exactly when to activate the timers. Operational
Security was clearly conducted, but did not interfere with
the preparations for this mission.
Repetition was also demonstrated in this phase. Full
dress rehearsals were conducted prior to this mission. Boat
transit times were rehearsed to determine the exact speed
they could expect to maintain with the weight of their
equipment. All equipment that was going on the mission was
used in the rehearsals to ensure familiarity. The same
people who were going to swim in to the beach practiced
swimming together and communicating with hand signals. All
phases of this mission were rehearsed by the same people who
would conduct this mission. The value of McRaven's element
of repetition was obviously understood and rehearsed for in
this mission.
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McRaven's element of surprise was accounted for in the
plan. The entire mission was to be conducted under the
cover of darkness. No SEAL was to go ashore to possibly-
alert the enemy before the charges were in place.
McRaven's last two elements of speed and purpose were
also accounted for. If one considers the target area to be
the point where the swimmers reach the beach, then the
entire time on target for this mission was to be no more
than the time required to place the explosives and activate
the timers. This time should take less than thirty minutes.
The purpose was clear as well. Each SEAL knew and had
rehearsed their part of the mission. They also knew that if
they were successful, their efforts should deceive the enemy
and divert their attention away from the ground war that was
about to kick off.
This mission is the first mission to account for all
elements of Vandenbroucke ' s and McRaven's theories during
the preparatory phase. Also, of particular note is that
even though the SEALs expected to encounter little if any
enemy resistance, like the previous missions analyzed, they
had planned for the worst case scenario. They have planned
for and equipped themselves to be able to deal with a wide
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array of contingencies, from those resulting from enemy-
contact to equipment failure. Note too, that they conducted
thorough radio checks with all planned and unplanned support
forces. Demonstrating none of Vandenbroucke ' s reasons for
failure and all of McRaven's reasons for success, this
mission should succeed.
4 . Execution Phase
About sunset on 23 February, the four HSBs, each
powered by two 1000 horse power engines, departed Ras Al
Mishab with Foxtrot Platoon aboard. They had just been told
that the ground war was to start at 04 00. The seas were
calm and the skies were slightly overcast. The CRRCs were
carried uninflated and stowed in the bow of the HSBs . As
the HSBs approached the launch CRRC point, the boats were
inflated and outboard motors put in place. Three boats were
launched ten miles offshore at around 2130. There were five
men in each boat. Enroute to the swimmer insertion point,
one engine was misfiring and required replacement. The
engine was quickly replaced with a spare, and the SEALs were
on their way in less than five minutes.
The air temperature was cold. Both the air and water
temperature were in the low 50' s. Explosions could be heard
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in the distance and the beach was backlighted by an oil
pipeline that had been blown up about a mile inland. The
lighting made visibility better for the swimmers, but much
more difficult for anyone on shore looking seaward.
As the CRRCs approached the beach, Night Vision Goggles
and a thermal imager were used to surveil the coastline.
The sky was filled with smoke from the burning oil and made
for a particularly dark night.
At a point 500 meters offshore, six swimmers, including
Deitz, slipped into the water and swam together toward the
beach. When they reached about seven feet of water they
spread out to 50 yard intervals and continued toward the
beach individually. The distance between them was such that
each could just barely make out the swimmer next to them,
but they had rehearsed the movement and knew the timing.
The explosives were set in about 8-10 inches of water.
Each charge had two timers. One timer served as a backup in
case the first failed. There was no surf, so they did not
need to be secured to the bottom. The charges were set to
go off in two hours. Now all the SEALs had to do was
activate the timers so that the charges would go off at
exactly 1 A.M.
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The pins were not pulled at exactly 11 P.M. Water
temperature affected the clock mechanisms. Deitz had a
table that he used to calculate the minutes lost or gained.
For the 53 degree water that night, the timer would detonate
thirteen minutes late. At 10:47, Deitz signaled his men to
pull the pins activating the timers. The SEALs then
retraced their routes, and swam together for a short
distance out to sea. The charges were placed to time with
the start of ebb tide. When detonation occurred the charges
would be above water and the sound of the detonation would
not be muffled by the water.
Deitz contacted the CRRCs by radio that the group was
returning. "Foxtrot Two, stand by for signal," he whispered
into his radio. He then used a directional red lens
flashlight to signal for pick up. The red lens was used to
signal out to sea and could not be seen on shore. "Roger,
got your signal, came the reply."
While the swimmers were completing their work, the
SEALs in the CRRCs were positioning orange buoys to look
like lane markers.
20
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The swimmers were recovered at 233 and began the
return transit to the waiting HSBs. After rendezvousing
with the HSBs, gear was stored and Dietz passed the codeword
"Pamela" back to headquarters to let them know all was well.
Two of the HSBs then idled in to about 300 yards off shore.
At 03 they began to fire into the beach with machine guns
and grenade launchers. They also randomly threw five half-
pound blocks of C-4 over the side to add to the show. About
five minutes after the last half-pound block exploded, the
charges on the beach detonated, exactly on time.
The HSBs then grouped together for the return transit
to Ras Al Mishab. They arrived at 023 0.
After a debriefing, the SEALs were put into isolation.
Later that morning, Deitz received a cable from Smith. The
cable read, "Tom: Please pass to your men an 'extremely
well done' on last night's mission." the cable went on to
explain that an intelligence report had confirmed that not
only had the guns of the coastal defenders remained pointed
toward the gulf, but elements of two Iraqi divisions reacted
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5. Execution Phase Analysis
It is difficult to determine which of Vandenbroucke'
s
or McRaven's theories can explain the success of this
mission. All elements of each theory were planned for and
executed. In terms of Vandenbroucke, senior leaders such as
Schwarzkopf and Smith understood the value and limitations
of the Naval Special Warfare forces working for them. Both
of these decision makers were realists in the capabilities
of these forces. Unique to this entire Gulf War operation
were the criteria that were used to determine if a mission
was right for Naval Special Warfare. This criteria
effectively eliminated the chances for wishful thinking. As
has already been shown, intelligence was excellent.
Information to decision makers was accurate and realistic as
well. NSW mission concepts, approved at SOCCENT, were
personally briefed to General Schwarzkopf by COMSOCCENT or
CNSWTG-C. There was no perceived lack of understanding at
the CENTCOM level about the SOF-NSW role. Captain Smith
made every effort to personally keep all senior leaders
accurately informed on NSW missions and capabilities.
Coordination and cooperation were excellent. In the lessons
learned from this operation it states, "The willingness and
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ability of operational units and individuals to
cooperatively solve problems and provide mutual support was
a significant factor in the success of NSW operations."
This mission did not display Vandenbroucke '
s
micromanagement during execution. Great thought went into
any contingencies that might occur, and a lengthy execution
checklist was created to keep senior leaders informed on the
mission as it progressed. An execution checklist is a list
of codewords that are passed via radio to headquarters.
Each codeword represents a specific task or phase of the
execution. Senior leaders knew what the platoon was doing
each step of the way and had already approved what they
would do if things went wrong. Micromanagement was not a
temptation because the senior leaders had confidence in a
well thought out plan that also kept them informed.
All of McRaven's elements for success were executed as
well. Perhaps the most important contributing factor was
that the mission was simple. One SEAL on the mission said
the operation was boringly successful. This highlights the
fact that NSW missions can be almost routine, but result in
a big strategic payback. Keep in mind that despite this
22
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simplicity, there was always the possibility that the enemy
might see the SEALs if they had not planned or executed the
mission properly.
McRaven's element of repetition in the form of
rehearsals contributed to the speed and overall success as
well. The SEALs went in undetected and quickly executed the
purpose of the mission. The mission had one surprising
moment when the engine of one of the boats malfunctioned,
but the platoon had planned for such a contingency and
calmly executed the plan of swapping the motor with a spare.
It is difficult to say how this mission would have turned
out had the enemy been contacted, but detailed plans had
been thought out if such an incident happened.
Communications checks had been conducted to help ensure such
contingency plans were executable. It seems likely that the
enemy would have had their hands full as they did throughout
this war.
NSW forces completed over 270 combat missions and
experienced no combat casualties during Operation DESERT
SHIELD/STORM. The deception operation at Mina Saud
demonstrates that Special Operations forces can be used
effectively and can make significant contribution to any
131
military operation. Although some might say that this
operation was too easy, its significance is that it
demonstrates that regardless of the simplicity of a mission,
no detail should be forgotten. All contingencies within
reasonable expectations must be planned for. Above all,
never underestimate the enemy.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The three Navy Special Operations analyzed in this
thesis offer many insights into the principles of special
operations. The first two operations, URGENT FURY and JUST
CAUSE were failures at many levels even though the mission
objectives were eventually accomplished. The deception
operation at Mina Saud during DESERT STORM was a complete
success at all levels. Why the first two operations failed
and why the last operation succeeded can at least in part be
explained with the use of Vandenbroucke ' s and McRaven's
theories. Important also is the clear development of these
forces as they learned from their mistakes and found their
niche in the overall reorganization of the U.S. defense
establishment
.
These operations were conducted over a span of about 8
years, and the performance of these forces both by senior
planners and operators shows that past mistakes seem to have
been understood and corrected. This is the key that must
never be forgotten. It is unreasonable to think that even
elite forces will not make mistakes. The frictions of war
and Murphy's Law will always influence the outcome of any
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operation. But mistakes must never be forgotten. The
lessons learned from these mistakes must be
institutionalized so that future generations of special
operations forces do not make the same mistakes. Many times
we learn in the wake of failure and forget the lessons we
learned in the wake of success. The face of war is certain
to change, but the fundamental principles learned from both
success and failure will always have value in any operation.
As was first discussed in chapter one, both
Vandenbroucke ' s and McRaven's theories offer a formula
derived from failure and success. Vandenbroucke' s elements
of faulty intelligence, poor cooperation and coordination,
inadequate advice and information to decision makers,
wishful thinking, and micromanagement from outside the
theater were all derived from operations considered to be
failures. McRaven's elements of simplicity, security,
repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose were derived from
operations that were considered to be successful.
Separately these theories do not fully explain the outcome
of these missions, combined they do.
Vandenbrouke ' s element of faulty intelligence was a
contributing factor in the failures of both URGENT FURY and
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JUST CAUSE. Both of these operations lacked adequate
intelligence. During the Grenada operation, the SEALs had
very little information about the actual forces in the
vicinity of the Governor General's house or even the
specifics about the layout of the compound. This lack of
information resulted in their having problems on their
insertion and in being poorly prepared for the intensity of
the enemy reaction.
In Panama, much the same can be said. The SEALs on
this operation based their plan on intelligence reports that
said that the enemy resistance would be minimal. These
forces soon found themselves in an open area fighting an
enemy that was determined to hold their ground. More
accurate intelligence, especially regarding enemy
capabilities, might have allowed for better planning. Both
the Grenada and Panama operations suffered the consequences
of poor intelligence.
Poor coordination was also a contributing factor in the
Panama operation. In Panama, coordinated close air support
was planned for, but suffered problems when the ground force
was unable to communicate with the AC- 13 gunship. This
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operation also suffered from communications problems in
coordinating MEDEVAC procedures.
The operations in Grenada and Panama also experienced
problems with inadequate advice and information to decision
makers. In both of these operations, the mission was that
of securing and holding an area until being relieved by-
larger forces. These were not special operations. Senior
decision makers, in each one, were misinformed on the
capabilities and missions of these forces. Current thinking
in regards to holding missions or airport seizures would
assign a more appropriate force, such as the Rangers or
Marines. These forces train for this type of mission and
have the numbers and associated firepower such holding
missions require. If the senior planners had been properly
advised, then other more appropriate forces would have been
assigned and these failures might not have happened.
Wishful thinking manifests itself in Grenada and Panama
as well. In both of these cases, the preparatory phases
reflected that both planners and decision makers were
victims of wishful thinking. In both of these operations
the actual enemy strength was never known for sure . The
plans derived in light of this uncertainty erred on the side
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of minimal resistance. In dealing with this unknown factor,
clearly the senior planners and operators "wished away" the
equally possible reality of stiff enemy resistance. In
addition, problems discovered during rehearsals for Panama,
such as the vulnerability of the SEALs to enemy fire, the
difficulties in command and control of platoon movement, and
MEDEVAC communications difficulties were simply wished away
by senior SEAL leaders. Both of these missions suffered the
grave consequences of wishful thinking.
Over control of mission execution by officials outside
the theater of operations seems to have only been a problem
during the Panama operation. When the ROE were changed at
the last minute, the execution plan had to be changed as
well. The ROE changed from "permissive force allowed" to
"limiting collateral damage" to an absolute minimum. This
last minute change in ROE affected the performance of the
SEALs. Minimal damage seems to be appropriate if there is
minimal enemy resistance, but not if men are fighting for
their lives. Such concern for the enemy's airplane seems
contradictory to a mission expecting heavy fighting. This
change of ROE likely only reinforced the misconception and
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wishful thinking that the enemy would just roll over at the
mere sight of the SEALs . The results were devastating.
McRaven derived his theory from operations that he
considered to be a success. His theory states that special
operations forces are able to succeed if they have a simple
plan, which is carefully concealed, realistically rehearsed,
and executed with surprise, speed and purpose. The Grenada
and Panama operations had many violations in terms of these
principles. The mission during Operation DESERT STORM
violated none of these principles. It is interesting to see
how these principles help to explain the different outcomes
of these missions.
Perhaps the worst violation of the simplicity rule is
the Panama operation. The plan started out simple, but
continually increased in complexity as H-hour approached.
SEALs train for operations that require only a platoon, 12-
16 men, or less. The force structure originally considered
for this operation required 2 platoons, or 24 men. By the
time the mission was executed, the force structure had
swelled to over sixty personnel. This increased the
complexity of the plan and created command and control
problems. These problems were expressed during rehearsals,
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and continued to effect the mission throughout the execution
as well.
Security was breached in both Grenada and Panama.
During Grenada, the enemy knew that United States forces
were about to attack and even broadcast a warning over the
radio prior to the SEALs inserting. In Panama, LTG Stiner
moved H-hour up because he felt that the enemy had been
alerted prior to the invasion. In both cases the SEALs
confronted an enemy that was ready and waiting.
McRaven's element of repetition was a consequence in
both of the failed missions as well. These operations
failed in part due to no rehearsals, as in the case of
Grenada, or poor rehearsals, as in the case of Panama. In
Grenada, the SEALs did not make the time to rehearse. Their
performance showed the results when they forgot mission
essential equipment on insertion. Proper rehearsals might
also have revealed the need for close air support and other
standard planning considerations that this plan lacked.
Rehearsals were conducted for the Panama operation, but
their usefulness was greatly diminished when the actual
forces that eventually conducted the mission did not
participate in the rehearsals. In addition, the problems
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that the rehearsals revealed, such as command and control
and MEDEVAC procedures, were not properly addressed.
Surprise and speed were both a problem during Grenada
and Panama as well. Surprise was lost during Grenada when a
delay caused the SEALs to go in during daylight hours
instead of night. They also lost the element of surprise
when radio broadcasts announced to the enemy that the
invasion was about to begin.
Surprise was lost on the Panama operation when the
ground war started prior to the SEALs being in position.
The SEALs then ran to their objective announcing their
arrival with their noise and haste.
In regards to speed, both of these failed missions were
planned to last for longer than the average thirty minutes
that McRaven considers to be an operation that utilizes
speed. Not only were these operations planned to last four
hours, they ended up lasting 24 hours in the Grenada case,
and 37 hours in the Panama case. Both clearly violate
McRaven' s element of speed.
McRaven' s last element of purpose was also problematic
in Grenada and Panama. During the Grenada operation, the
forces assigned to execute specific missions changed several
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times. This meant that the purpose for the involvement of
specific forces constantly changed as well. The result was
a severely condensed planning phase for the operation. This
contributed to the poor plan that resulted.
The ROE change in the Panama operation, as discussed
earlier, created uncertainty in the minds of the SEALS as to
the purpose of the mission. This contributed to their
disregard for stealth during mission execution.
The one mission that succeeded was the deception
operation at Mina Saud during DESERT STORM. This operation
displayed none of Vandenbroucke' s reasons for failure and
all of McRaven's elements for success. The key to
understanding the overall success of this mission is
understanding the success at all levels of this mission.
The senior decision makers were well informed on the
capabilities and limitations of the SEALs . Senior planners
formulated specific criteria that were used to determine
whether the SEALs were the force of choice for a mission.
Intelligence at all levels was excellent. The potential for
stiff enemy resistance was not wished away, but clearly
planned for. Great detail in the planning by the operators
accounted for all reasonable contingencies. Senior leaders
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were familiar with the plan and were kept informed through
the use of a detailed execution check list. These factors
eliminated the temptation for senior leaders to interfere in
the execution. Coordination was superb. Communications
checks among all forces in the area were successfully-
conducted prior to the mission. The plan was simple,
carefully concealed, well rehearsed, and executed with
surprise, speed and purpose. As Vandenbroucke and McRaven
would have predicted, this operation was a success for the
senior decision makers and the men who planned and executed
the mission.
From the analysis of these missions, both theories seem
to provide a useful tool for thinking about the failure or
success of special operations. They both provide broad
elements for formulating a plan for success. The most
important lessons to be learned from these missions seem to
fall within the parameters established by these theories.
First, senior leaders must have a clear understanding
of the capabilities and limitations of the forces under
their influence. They must be provided with advice and
information that is free of bias and full of facts. Special
operations leaders must not allow themselves to fall victim
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to the temptation of wanting a "piece of the pie" at the
expense of the men conducting the operation. Naval Special
Warfare must decide the parameters for missions that the
SEALs are capable of conducting. They must train for and
advertise these mission capabilities to theater CINCs
.
Second, planners must consider all reasonable
contingencies. Detailed plans must be formulated that not
only accomplish the mission, but also provide a response if
things go wrong. Planners must ensure that the level of
detail is such that senior leaders and operators alike, have
confidence that the mission will succeed. Finally, if there
is any doubt as to the capabilities of the enemy, expect the
worst
.
Great strides have been demonstrated to this end. The
formation of one Special Operations Command given the
responsibility of training, equipping and coordinating one
special operations force has been successful . The
additional responsibility of educating the entire military
on special operations has added to this success. The
military, and most importantly the special operations




We must learn from our past to plan for our future. We
must continue to educate not only our forces, but the
political leadership that controls them. As recent trends
in Congress currently demonstrate, personal military
experience is likely to diminish among future political
leaders. These political leaders will increasingly look to
military leaders for advice on military matters. It is
incumbent upon the senior military leaders of today, and the
future, to first ensure they understand their military, and
then communicate that understanding to the political
leaders
.
The decision and planning that involves the use of
military intervention must be based on careful analysis.
The same can be said for the use of special operations
forces. Special operations forces can provide utilities
that far outweigh their numbers, if they are used properly.
Special operations can succeed. Understanding special
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